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INTRODUCTION 
olicymakers have a diverse tool chest of policy instruments at 
their disposal when tackling environmental problems. These tools 
include taxes, subsidies, marketable allowances, quotas, “command-
and-control” regulations such as technology and performance 
standards, deposit-refund programs, licensing schemes, information 
and labeling requirements, insurance mandates, and the entitlement of 
property and liability rights.1 In establishing an innovative 
environmental policy taxonomy, Kenneth Richards explains that the 
appropriate policy must achieve its environmental goal, subject to 
legal and political constraints, and it should minimize abatement 
costs, implementation costs, and undesirable effects on public 
finance.2 Under Richards’s framework, the first dimension of 
environmental policy instrument choice concerns the fundamental 
role of government.3 As Richards sees it, the government can act as 
an entitlement setter or as a regulator. That is, lawmakers can choose 
to assign property or liability rights, effectively yielding control over 
pollution abatement to the market by way of an iterative series of 
private negotiations and court rulings. Alternatively, the government 
can enact one of the other instruments mentioned above. This 
common economic instrumentalist approach characterizes tort law as 
a public regulatory tool, which policymakers may choose in the same 
way that they might choose a command-and-control regulation.4 
	  
1 See Kenneth R. Richards, Framing Environmental Policy Instrument Choice, 10 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 221, 222 (2000); Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, The 
Choice of Instruments for Environmental Policy: Liability or Regulation?, in AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: ISSUES IN 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 245 (Timothy Swanson ed., 2002); Lori Snyder Bennear & Robert 
N. Stavins, Second-Best Theory and the Use of Multiple Policy Instruments, 37 ENVTL. & 
RESOURCE ECON. 111, 111 (2007). 
2 Richards, supra note 1, at 224–30. 
3 Id. at 232–36. 
4 Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 
357, 357–58 (1984) [hereinafter Shavell 1984]; Kyle D. Logue, Coordinating Sanctions in 
Tort, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2313, 2314 (2010). 
P 
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Indeed, scholars of public health and safety have been debating the 
effectiveness of tort law as a regulatory tool for decades.5 Much of the 
literature comparing liability entitlements with public regulations, 
however, lacks interdisciplinary dialogue and is therefore quite 
fragmented. The question of tort law as a policy instrument is almost 
exclusively evaluated by law and economics scholars and almost 
completely overlooked by the political science and public policy 
fields. Law and economics scholars, on the other hand, generally fail 
to account for the findings from those fields in their comparisons of 
tort law and public regulation.6 Empirical evidence on the 
effectiveness of liability entitlements in reducing the incidence of 
harm to human health and the environment is also scarce and 
notoriously difficult to generate. Attempts to draw conclusions about 
the instrumental efficacy of environmental tort law, therefore, have 
been inconclusive. What’s more, the legal literature on this topic is 
muddled because the field has failed to adopt a set of universal 
criteria by which to compare tort law to public regulation. 
Advancing debate by applying comparative criteria to examine the 
efficacy of tort law as a regulatory tool is a worthwhile endeavor 
because the role of tort law in environmental regulation is a timely 
issue. Faced with the prospect of relatively lax enforcement of 
environmental regulations, legal and policy scholars in the early 
2000s engaged in a heightened discussion of the use of tort law as an 
alternative to the promulgation of public environmental regulations.7 
Today, political gridlock, a severely anti-environment House of 
Representatives, and novel risks from cross-state air pollution, 	  
5 See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); 
Charles D. Kolstad et al., Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: 
Substitutes or Complements?, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 888 (1990); Kenneth S. Abraham, The 
Relation Between Civil Liability and Environmental Regulation: An Analytical Overview, 
41 WASHBURN L.J. 379 (2002); David E. Adelman & Ian J. Duncan, The Limits of 
Liability in Promoting Safe Geologic Sequestration of CO2, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
F. 1, 23 (2011); Logue, supra note 4; Patrick W. Schmitz, On the Joint Use of Liability 
and Safety Regulation, 20 INT’L REV. LAW & ECON. 371 (2000); Shavell 1984, supra note 
4. 
6 See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE 
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 10–11 (2010) (discussing the lack of interdisciplinary dialogue on 
the question of tort law as a policy instrument); Logue, supra note 4, at 2315 (indicating 
that scholarly work in this area is lacking). 
7 For example, the Washburn University School of Law hosted a seminar in 2001 
entitled, “Using Torts as an Alternative to the Enforcement of Environmental 
Regulations.” The Case Western Reserve University School of Law also held a 
symposium in 2008 on “Common Law Environmental Protection.” 
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fracking, geologic carbon sequestration, and other activities continue 
to make the issue of liability as a policy tool ripe for consideration. 
Some scholars suggest that the use of tort law as a regulatory tool is in 
fact already on the rise.8 Empirical work by Sean Farhang suggests 
that political conflict and polarization make private enforcement a 
more politically viable statutory tool than other public regulatory 
instruments.9 
Additionally, heightened clarity on the usefulness of tort law as a 
complementary policy instrument to public regulations may have 
legal implications. In 2010, the Fourth Circuit held that the Clean Air 
Act (CAA) preempts state tort suits because allowing litigation would 
interfere with the policy objectives of the statute.10 There has since 
been a rash of cases that follow the Fourth Circuit’s rationale.11 In 
August 2013, however, the Third Circuit, in Bell v. Cheswick 
Generating Station, overruled the Western District of Pennsylvania to 
hold that the CAA does not preempt state tort law, creating a conflict 
between the precedent of the Third and Fourth Circuits.12 The 
judiciary’s uneasiness with embracing the regulatory effects of tort 
law can be traced at least back to Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 
where Judge Bergan, writing for the New York Court of Appeals, 
opined, “that the judicial establishment is neither equipped . . . nor 
prepared to lay down and implement an effective policy for the 
elimination of air pollution.”13 
Political polarization makes it more difficult for both Congress and 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to enact and enforce 
environmental laws, making it increasingly likely that individuals 
harmed from novel activities may resort to litigation. What’s more, 	  
8 ANDREW P. MORRISS ET AL., REGULATION BY LITIGATION 1 (2009). 
9 FARHANG, supra note 6, at 5, 32–44, 76–80; see also MORRISS ET AL., supra note 8, 
at 4. 
10 North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth. (TVA), 615 F.3d 291, 303 (4th 
Cir. 2010). 
11 See, e.g., Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 903 F. Supp. 2d 314, 321–22 (W.D. 
Pa. 2012); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849, 865 (S.D. Miss. 2012); 
United States v. EME Homer City Generation L.P., 823 F. Supp. 2d 274, 294–97 (W.D. 
Pa. 2011); see also Nigel Barrella, Comment, North Carolina v. Tennessee Valley 
Authority, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 247, 259–61 (2011) (criticizing the decision in North 
Carolina v. Tennessee Valley Authority); Emily Sangi, Note, The Gap-Filling Role of 
Nuisance in Interstate Air Pollution, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 479, 512–16 (2011) (providing a 
thorough and convincing critique of the preemption analysis in North Carolina v. 
Tennessee Valley Authority). 
12 No. 12-4216, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 17283, at *23 (3d Cir. Aug. 20, 2013). 
13 257 N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1970).  
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many of the grand statutory frameworks are ill-equipped to address 
complex contemporary pollution problems, leaving regulatory gaps 
that tort law can fill. In this Article, therefore, I take Judge Bergan’s 
rationale in Boomer to task. 
The debate between tort law and public regulation presents a false 
choice: neither is best all of the time. Government should not rely on 
tort law as a lone policy instrument to address environmental and 
public health problems; but neither should government preempt tort 
law because it functions well as a complementary tool to regulatory 
programs in many instances. Allowing tort suits does not constitute 
laying down a policy for the elimination of pollution, as Boomer 
claims. Recognizing that tort law and public regulation are 
complements, not substitutes, I argue that the judiciary should not let 
an unfounded fear of interference with a federal statutory program 
lead them towards misguided preemption decisions. I also contend 
that Congress should enact environmental statutes with (and amend 
current statutes to have) unmistakably clear preemption savings 
clauses for state tort law and that policymakers should more seriously 
consider liability entitlements—including heightened liability 
standards, damage enhancements, and plaintiffs’ fee shifts—as policy 
instruments to be incorporated into public regulatory programs. 
Part I provides a basis for my normative arguments by reviewing 
economic and legal theories of liability law. Part II advances the 
discussion by explaining the distinctiveness of tort liability in the 
context of environmental policy. Part III adopts criteria from the 
public policy field to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of tort 
law as an environmental policy instrument relative to public 
regulation. The final section draws all of the material together, 
weighing the strengths and weaknesses of tort law and public 
regulation against one another and highlighting the circumstances in 
which tort law is most likely to be an effective and efficient 
environmental policy instrument. I conclude that, in most 
circumstances, tort law will not function efficiently and effectively as 
a lone policy instrument; but nonetheless, it serves important 
functions as a complement to regulatory rules. 
I 
THEORIES OF LIABILITY 
Individuals often take actions that adversely affect others. Those 
actions produce negative environmental externalities when they cause 
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unaccounted-for damage to human health or the environment.14 The 
result is an inefficient allocation of market resources, and it generally 
falls on the government to address these market failures.15 A body of 
literature has developed to determine the policy instrument that the 
government should employ when addressing various types of market 
failure. In his instrument choice taxonomy, the first question that 
Richards addresses is the “Fundamental Role of Government”—
whether policymakers should choose public regulatory programs 
enforced by administrative agencies that are designed to prevent 
health and safety problems from developing ex ante, or property and 
liability entitlements, which address harm ex post.16 
Many of the scholars that have engaged in this debate have framed 
the issue as a choice between one of two competing substitutes: a 
liability standard or public regulation.17 Charles Kolstad, Thomas 
Ulen, and Gary Johnson developed a theoretical model, however, 
which posits that tort law and public regulation are complements, not 
substitutes.18 They argue that “[o]ne of the most noticeable features of 
current policy dealing with externality-generating activities in a wide 
number of areas is that ex ante and ex post policies are very 
frequently used jointly.”19 
For instance, in the case of a noisy or polluting industrial operation 
located near a residential area, zoning regulations generally provide 
an ex ante public control that reduces the likelihood that these 	  
14 See DANIEL H. COLE & PETER Z. GROSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW & ECONOMICS 
18–20, 390–92 (2d ed. 2011); CHARLES WOLF, JR., MARKETS OR GOVERNMENTS: 
CHOOSING BETWEEN IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 20–21 (2d ed. 1993); Henry N. Butler, A 
Defense of Common Law Environmentalism: The Discovery of Better Environmental 
Policy, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 705, 710 (2008). 
15 WOLF, supra note 14, at 17–18, 21. 
16 Richards, supra note 1, at 232–36. 
17 See, e.g., Adelman & Duncan, supra note 5, at 23; Peter Cane, Using Tort Law to 
Enforce Environmental Regulations?, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 427, 455–66 (2002); Logue, 
supra note 4, at 2325; Richards, supra note 1, at 235; Schmitz, supra note 5, at 371–72; 
W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance, 
Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 YALE J. ON 
REG. 65, 65–66 (1989). 
18 Kolstad et al., supra note 5; see also Denise Antolini, Attacking Bananas and 
Defending Environmental Common Law, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 663 (2008) (critiquing 
the substitutes frame). 
19 Kolstad et al., supra note 5, at 888–89; see also CHARLES D. KOLSTAD, 
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 386–87 (2d ed. 2011); Adelman & Duncan, supra note 5, 
at 23; Bennear & Stavins, supra note 1, at 113; William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical 
Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 
1588–89 (2007) (discussing Bates v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C., 544 U.S. 431, 450 
(2005)). 
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competing land uses come into contact with one another, whereas 
nuisance remedies provide an ex post private backstop to resolve 
disputes in the event of conflict. The Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA)20 is an ex ante regulation that governs the 
cradle-to-grave use and disposal of toxic wastes, whereas the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Conservation, and Liability 
Act (CERCLA)21 entitles victims of certain hazardous waste 
exposures to compensation and a cause of action against the 
responsible parties after a harm has already occurred. Any regulatory 
scheme Congress chooses, though, will be enacted over a backdrop of 
pre-existing (mostly state) common law and statutory liability rules. 
In a tort action, a defendant is liable when the law requires her to 
pay damages for an injury suffered by the plaintiff. Additionally, in 
nuisance actions, the court may also issue an injunction on the 
tortfeasor to discontinue the harmful activity, and in certain liability 
suits, juries may award punitive damages to punish outrageous 
conduct.22 Most often, though, the plaintiff is entitled to special 
damages for her out-of-pocket expenses and general damages for her 
pain and suffering.23 Additionally, courts may award damages for 
harm that a plaintiff proves she has suffered and will suffer in the 
future.24 In the majority of cases, these constitute the range of 
available tort remedies. These remedies have regulatory effects that 
merit economic analysis. The following sections explain the 
theoretical basis for understanding tort standards as regulatory 
instruments. 
A. Economic Theories of Liability 
Economic theories of liability have burgeoned into a well-
developed and widely accepted body of scholarship since Ronald 
Coase first published The Problem of Social Cost in 1960.25 With his 
invariance thesis, which has become widely known as the “Coase 	  
20 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–92 (2006). 
21 §§ 9601–75. 
22 Abraham, supra note 5, at 388 (discussing injunctions); Andrew F. Popper, In 
Defense of Deterrence, 75 ALB. L. REV. 181, 191–93 (2011). 
23 Abraham, supra note 5, at 388–89. For additional discussions of environmental tort 
remedies, see Jason J. Czarnezki & Mark L. Thomsen, Advancing the Rebirth of 
Environmental Common Law, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2007) and Roger 
Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern Environmental Policy, 
7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 923, 941–46 (1999). 
24 Abraham, supra note 5, at 388. 
25 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
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Theorem,” Coase posited that in a market free of transaction costs, 
where entitlements are fully assigned and where all parties have full 
information, private parties, through costless negotiations with one 
another, will achieve the optimal allocation of resources regardless of 
the liability rule in place.26 In other words, the government can entitle 
victims to compensation or it can entitle polluters with a right to 
pollute. If there are no transaction costs (e.g., if victims can identify 
polluters and vice versa, victims know the value of harm they have 
suffered, and polluters know the value of pollution and the costs of 
abatement), then the parties can negotiate with one another to achieve 
the optimal levels of pollution and abatement regardless of who holds 
the entitlement. The only effect of the entitlement is to determine 
whether the polluter pays the victims for the right to harm them or 
whether the victims pay the polluter to abate some of its pollution. 
Thus, the lower the transaction costs are, the less the allocation of 
legal rights matters. 
Of course, as Coase acknowledged, we do not live in a world that 
is free of market distortions and transaction costs, where parties have 
full information.27 Indeed, the New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
perspective, pioneered by Coase and expounded by Oliver 
Williamson, recognizes that the optimal policy instrument will vary 
depending on transaction costs.28 
These costs are central to policy instrument choice when the parties 
to a would-be transaction and the transaction itself both exhibit 
certain characteristics. Williamson identifies the behavioral 
assumptions about the parties as bounded rationality and 
opportunism.29 “Bounded rationality refers to the cognitive limits of 
the parties . . . .”30 That is, limitations on brainpower preclude 
individuals from considering every important factor and accounting 
for every possible contingency in making decisions. The theory of 	  
26 Id.; see also COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 14, at 68–70, 393–95; RICHARD A. 
EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 136 (8th ed. 2004); NEIL K. KOMESAR, 
IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 105–12 (1994); WOLF, supra note 14, at 22; Butler, supra note 14, at 712–14; 
Robert D. Cooter, Economic Theories of Legal Liability, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 11, 18–19 
(1991); Richards, supra note 1, at 233. 
27 WOLF, supra note 14, at 23; see also Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1106. 
28 For a brief explanation of the NIE school of thought, see COLE & GROSSMAN, supra 
note 14, at 78. 
29 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 44–49 
(1985). 
30 Richards, supra note 1, at 259; see also COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 14, at 81–
84; WILLIAMSON, supra note 29, at 45. 
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opportunism simply suggests that parties will not only act in their 
own self-interest, but will do so with “guile.”31 Williamson writes, 
“opportunism refers to [parties’ tendency to provide] incomplete or 
distorted disclosure of information, especially to calculated efforts to 
mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse.”32 Finally, 
uncertainty generated by external factors, limited communication, and 
barriers to trust can generate costs, especially given the cognitive 
limits and biases of the parties.33 
Transaction costs, market failures, policy failures, and political 
constraints create what economists have dubbed “second-best” 
problems. The theory of second best maintains that the correction of 
one market failure or constraint may not produce an efficient outcome 
if other failures or constraints exist, even in apparently unrelated 
markets.34 For example, correcting an air pollution externality might 
not maximize social welfare if there is a policy failure in the 
governance of water pollution: facilities could scrub pollutants out of 
their emissions and deposit them into their effluents. Such problems 
often call for multiple policy instruments for different environmental 
mediums, at different levels of governance, that are both preventative 
(ex ante) and remedial (ex post) in nature. 
In the context of liability as a policy tool, the theory of second best 
may justify the practical reliance on tort law in certain situations 
where economists (or courts) would otherwise not think to rely on 
private enforcement if the market was free of distortions. Though they 
do not address the use of tort law as a policy tool in their theoretical 
work, Lori Bennear and Robert Stavins, for example, “demonstrate 
that the second-best nature of problems addressed by policy makers 
justifies policy coordination and can justify the use of multiple policy 
instruments in a wide range of settings.”35 My analysis here 
illuminates the settings in which policymakers should consider tort 
law as one of the multiple policy tools that they employ to address 
pollution and ecological management problems. 
	  
31 WILLIAMSON, supra note 29, at 47; see also Richards, supra note 1, at 260. 
32 WILLIAMSON, supra note 29, at 47. 
33 Richards, supra note 1, at 261–65. 
34 COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 14, at 28–29; KOLSTAD, supra note 19, at 255; 
Bennear & Stavins, supra note 1, at 112; Daniel H. Cole, Comment, Environmental 
Instrument Choice in a Second-Best World: A Comment on Professor Richards, 10 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 287, 290–91 (2000); R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General 
Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11, 11 (1956). 
35 Bennear & Stavins, supra note 1, at 112.  
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In a second-best world, policymakers establish public regulations 
and legal entitlements with the goal of inducing private parties to 
make production and consumption decisions that in the aggregate will 
produce an economically efficient market. Among the various kinds 
of efficiency, law and economics scholars are concerned primarily 
with allocative efficiency, which refers to a welfare-maximizing 
distribution of goods and services.36 According to the Kaldor-Hicks 
criterion, a change in resource allocation will improve efficiency if 
three conditions are met.37 First, the change must make at least one 
person better off. Second, the person (or persons) made better off 
must theoretically be able to compensate all of those made worse off 
and still experience a net gain in welfare. And third, if those made 
worse off were to pay those made better off to forgo the change, then 
those made worse off would be in an even worse position. In a 
situation in which it is uncertain whether a benefit is worth its social 
cost, legal entitlements should be structured to place the costs on the 
party with the most knowledge, who is in the best position to make a 
benefit-cost analysis, and who can most cheaply avoid the costs of 
precaution.38 
A benefit-cost analysis is not always possible, though, because 
measuring the benefits of environmental and public health protection 
is an extremely difficult practice that often yields indeterminate 
results.39 Therefore, regulators often make environmental policy 
choices based on a cost-effectiveness criterion, whereby the optimal 
policy is one that minimizes the costs of achieving a stated objective, 
rather than an efficiency criterion.40 Examining tort law under a cost-
	  
36 COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 14, at 13. 
37 Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Inter-Personal 
Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939); J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare 
Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939); see also COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 14, at 15; 
KOLSTAD, supra note 19, at 52–56, 70–72, 83–86; KOMESAR, supra note 26, at 31–32. 
38 GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 135–97 (1970); EPSTEIN, supra note 
26, at 136, 644; Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1096–97; see also Union Oil Co. v. 
Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 569–71 (9th Cir. 1974) (applying the least-cost avoider theory). But 
see Donald G. Gifford, The Peculiar Challenges Posed by Latent Diseases Resulting from 
Mass Products, 64 MD. L. REV. 613, 617–18 (indicating that it is not always possible to 
identify the cheapest cost avoider).  
39  DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL 
DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 45 (1999); KOLSTAD, supra note 19, at 114–15, 
122–23, 126–27. 
40 See CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG, RULEMAKING: HOW 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 96 (2011); KOLSTAD, supra 
note 19, at 133–34; Robert N. Stavins, The Problem of the Commons: Still Unsettled After 
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effectiveness criterion would necessarily involve measuring 
governance costs, including the expense of maintaining the judicial 
system relative to the costs associated with alternative regulatory 
systems.41 In spite of the difficulty in measuring environmental 
benefits, much of the literature on tort law as a policy instrument 
evaluates liability standards in terms of efficiency.42 However, policy 
decisions do not turn solely on efficiency determinations: 
distributional concerns are as (and often are more) important than 
efficiency in reaching political decisions.43 
Thus, micro-economic theories of tort law generally recognize the 
two primary functions of the liability establishment as optimal 
deterrence of risky activity and corrective justice through 
compensation.44 Some scholars characterize these as “competing 
theories”45 and situate scholars into “camps.”46 Law and economics 
scholars as well as Progressive Realist scholars emphasize the 
deterrence theory of tort law—that tort law is a public policy 
instrument that can be used to spread losses, compensate victims, and 
reach the efficient balance between risky activity and precautionary 
measures.47 An opposing group of notable scholars maintains that tort 
law is primarily private law intended to provide victims of wrongful 
injury a means of redress.48 Ernest Weinrib, for example, rejects the 	  
100 Years, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 81, 92–94 (2011) (comparing efficiency and cost-
effectiveness). 
41 For a review of the costs of operating the tort system, see CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 
THE ECONOMICS OF U.S. TORT LIABILITY: A PRIMER 19–23 (2003) and COLE & 
GROSSMAN, supra note 14, at 272, 304–07. 
42 KOLSTAD, supra note 19, at 382–87; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAW 167–71, 178–79 (7th ed. 2007); WOLF, supra note 14, at 117; Kolstad et al., supra 
note 5. 
43 WOLF, supra note 14, at 119. 
44 COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 14, at 269–70; EPSTEIN, supra note 26, at 133–36; 
Abraham, supra note 5, at 389; Boyer & Porrini, supra note 1, at 258–59; Cane, supra 
note 17, at 428–35; Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the Laboratories of 
Democracy, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1501, 1508–10 (2009) [hereinafter Klass 2009]; 
Peter S. Menell, The Limitations of Legal Institutions for Addressing Environmental Risks, 
5 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 93 (1991); Christopher H. Schroeder, Lost in the Translation: What 
Environmental Regulation Does That Tort Cannot Duplicate, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 583, 587 
(2002); Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and 
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997) [hereinafter Schwartz 1997]. 
45 Schroeder, supra note 44, at 587. 
46 Klass 2009, supra note 44, at 1508–09. 
47 Id. This group includes Richard Posner, Fleming James, Leon Green, and William 
Prosser. 
48 Id. This group includes George Fletcher, Jules Coleman, Ernest Weinrib, John 
Goldberg, and Benjamin Zipursky. 
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deterrence theory on the basis that a plaintiff only has a cause of 
action for actual injuries suffered at the fault of the defendant, not 
risks taken by the defendant.49 
The dominant position, however, seems to be the instrumentalist 
view, which emphasizes the general deterrent effects of liability as 
public law.50 Actually, the classic response to Weinrib’s objection is 
to distinguish general from specific deterrence51—a distinction that 
originates in Guido Calabresi’s seminal work, The Cost of 
Accidents.52 Specific deterrence refers to the extent that a sanction for 
a discouraged or prohibited activity deters future infractions by the 
defendant herself.53 The theory of general deterrence, on the other 
hand, posits that sanctions exacted against one firm will generate 
“spillover effects” that encourage other similar companies to take 
precautionary measures in order to avoid being sanctioned 
themselves.54 Liability standards, therefore, may reduce risks taken 
by firms even if those firms are never sued. Empirical literature on the 
effectiveness of tort law as a general deterrence mechanism is sparse, 
and much of the deterrence literature evaluates the effects of 
regulatory enforcement actions.55 The following subsections discuss 
the theoretical regulatory effects of the primary legal theories of 
liability. 
B. Legal Theories of Liability 
1. Nuisance 
Pollution discharge can often cause damage to property. There are 
two closely related property torts available to plaintiffs whose 
property is damaged: trespass to land and nuisance. Nuisance is the 
	  
49 Cane, supra note 17, at 433. 
50 Klass 2009, supra note 44, at 1510. 
51 Cane, supra note 17, at 433. 
52 CALABRESI, supra note 38. 
53 Cane, supra note 17, at 433–34; Dorothy Thornton et al., General Deterrence and 
Corporate Environmental Behavior, 27 LAW & POL’Y 262, 263 (2005); Wayne B. Gray & 
Jay P. Shimshack, Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement in the United States: 
Empirical Evidence from the Economics Literature, 5 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 3, 16 
(2011). 
54 Cane, supra note 17, at 433–34; Gray & Shimshack, supra note 53; Thornton et al., 
supra note 53. 
55 See infra Part III.D. 
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typical theory in tort litigation involving pollution externalities.56 The 
Coase Theorem, explained above, posits that with perfect 
information, full entitlements, and no transaction costs, the parties 
would bargain for the efficient outcome—where the marginal costs of 
abatement to the polluter are equal to the marginal benefits of 
abatement to the victim. The parties must rely on the court to settle 
disputes because in general, neither party has access to full 
information, there are transaction costs, and entitlements may be 
unclear as to the parties. The resolution of a nuisance suit in favor of 
the plaintiff, then, is designed to internalize the external costs 
associated with pollution by simulating a market exchange between 
the defendant producing the externality and the plaintiff who must 
bear the cost.57 
Although litigation constitutes a large transaction cost, the judicial 
system remedies the lack of information: the plaintiff provides 
information on the costs of the nuisance-generating activity, and the 
defendant provides information on the benefits. Nuisance balancing 
“seems to instruct courts to offset those harms [endured by the 
plaintiff] by the unpaid-for benefits plaintiffs get from being in the 
same locale as the nuisance generator.”58 For example, in Boomer v. 
Atlantic Cement Co., the court balanced the plaintiffs’ injuries from 
the air pollution emitted from the defendant’s cement plant against the 
economic value of the plant to the community, leading the court to 
order a single payment of permanent damages rather than an 
injunction.59 
Although nuisance law operates according to an efficient 
standard—balancing the defendant’s cost of abating pollution against 
the plaintiff’s cost to withstand or eliminate it herself—Richard 
Posner notes that nuisance law has historically “never had much 
impact on the amount of pollution.”60 One reason for this is that 
environmental quality is a superior good—one for which consumption 
increases as income rises.61 In other words, as the income level rises 	  
56 BRUCE YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: 
CREATING WEALTH IN HUMMINGBIRD ECONOMIES 91 (1997); Abraham, supra note 5, at 
383; Czarnezki & Thomsen, supra note 23, at 4; Meiners & Yandle, supra note 23, at 926. 
57 Keith N. Hylton, When Should We Prefer Tort Law to Environmental Regulation?, 
41 WASHBURN L.J. 515, 526 (2002); SHELDON F. KURTZ & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW 794–95 (5th ed. 2007). 
58 Hylton, supra note 57, at 526. 
59 257 N.E. 2d 870, 871–72, 874–75 (N.Y. 1970). 
60 POSNER, supra note 42, at 63. 
61 Id. 
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in a certain area, demand for environmental quality in that area tends 
to increase as well.62 Nuisance law can therefore be understood “as a 
regulatory framework that encourages development in early phases, 
and then places greater restrictions later as the demand for 
environmental quality increases.”63 
J.B. Ruhl, on the other hand, explains that the limited use of 
nuisance as a contemporary environmental policy strategy is a 
product of trends in the evolution of economic and ecological 
thought.64 He posits that policymakers’ preference for public 
regulation beginning in the late 1960s and desire to protect “species 
and ecosystems for their intrinsic and ecological qualities” diminished 
the role of nuisance law as an environmental management strategy 
because the preservation of ecosystems for their intrinsic value is not 
traditionally actionable under a nuisance theory.65 However, several 
notable scholars, including Ruhl, John Copeland Nagle, and Christine 
Klein have identified the beginning of a new trend in which the 
movement towards economic valuation of ecological goods and 
services may bring nuisance litigation back to the forefront of 
environmental management.66 Indeed, while pollution control is 
governed by a variety of grand regulatory schemes, litigation of 
“ecological nuisances” may mature to fill regulatory holes in land use 
governance.67 
Moreover, trends in ecological nuisance litigation may also foretell 
a greater role of public nuisance litigation in the future of 	  
62 Id.; Hylton, supra note 57, at 527; Meiners & Yandle, supra note 23, at 949 (“As 
incomes rise, people prefer greater levels of environmental protection.”). 
63 Hylton, supra note 57, at 527; see also KURTZ & HOVENKAMP, supra note 57, at 
780–82; WOLF, supra note 14, at 60. For a history of nuisance and the regulation of 
pollution, see Joel Franklin Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 403 (1974); Jan G. Laitos, Legal Institutions and Pollution: Some 
Intersections Between Law and History, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 423 (1975); and Leslie 
Rosenthal, Economic Efficiency, Nuisance, and Sewage: New Lessons from Attorney-
General v. Council of the Borough of Birmingham, 1858–95, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 27 
(2007). 
64 J.B. Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 753, 756 (2008). 
65 Id. 
66 Christine A. Klein, The New Nuisance: An Antidote to Wetland Loss, Sprawl, and 
Global Warming, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1155 (2007); John Copeland Nagle, From Swamp 
Drainage to Wetlands Regulation to Ecological Nuisance to Environmental Ethics, 58 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 787 (2008); Ruhl, supra note 64 at 756–57; see also Stephen M. 
Johnson, From Climate Change and Hurricanes to Ecological Nuisances: Common Law 
Remedies for Public Law Failures?, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 565, 595–98 (2011). 
67 Ruhl, supra note 64, at 765–77; Johnson, supra note 66, at 595–97; Nagle, supra 
note 66, at 797–99. 
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environmental management.68 “A public nuisance is an unreasonable 
interference with a right common to the general public.”69 An 
interference is unreasonable if the conduct significantly interferes 
with the public health, safety, peace, comfort, or convenience; is 
prohibited by a statute or regulation; or has a permanent, long-lasting 
effect on a public right and the actor knows or has reason to know that 
her conduct has such an effect.70 Public nuisance suits are usually 
direct public actions brought by state officials to enforce regulations 
or criminal statutes.71 However, an individual may bring a public 
nuisance suit if she has “suffered harm of a kind different from that 
suffered by” the general public.72 Though infrequent, public nuisance 
actions brought by governmental bodies or private citizens may prove 
to be important policy instruments as science matures to draw cleaner 
connections between actions and their environmental, public health, 
and economic consequences. 
2. Negligence 
The heart of a negligence claim is the defendant’s breach of the 
duty of care owed to the plaintiff. A defendant who exercises 
reasonable care will not be found liable under a theory of negligence 
even if her actions clearly injured the plaintiff.73 In this sense, a 
negligence cause of action functions as a judicially imposed 
regulatory standard.74 
According to the Hand Rule, a defendant is liable in a negligence 
action if her cost of avoiding the accident would have been less than 
the cost of the injury multiplied by the probability of the injury.75 The 
Hand Rule has been accepted by many as the legal definition of 	  
68 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 66, at 597–98 (nanotechnology and industrial 
chemicals); Alice Kaswan, The Domestic Response to Global Climate Change: What Role 
for Federal, State, and Litigation Initiatives?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 91–100 (2007) 
(greenhouse gas emissions); Ruhl, supra note 64, at 775–77 (ecosystems). 
69 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1979). 
70 Id. § 821B(2). 
71 See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 26, at 640; Kaswan, supra note 68, at 92; Sangi, supra 
note 11, at 484. 
72  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(1). 
73 See, e.g., Rinaldo v. McGovern, 587 N.E.2d 264, 267 (N.Y. 1991) (“To provide an 
actionable theory of liability, a person injured . . . must affirmatively show that the 
[alleged tortfeasor] failed to exercise due care.”). 
74 Logue, supra note 4, at 2321–23, 2326. 
75 COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 14, at 273–75; POSNER, supra note 42, at 167–69; 
Cooter, supra note 26, at 13–14; Cherie Metcalf, Litigating Environmental Quality: An 
Economic Approach, 13 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 293, 302 (2004). 
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reasonable care.76 In fact, the theory that a tort standard functions as a 
deterrence mechanism can be traced77 to Judge Hand’s decision in 
United States v. Carroll Towing Co.78 Judge Hand calculated that 
firms will opt to pay the costs of litigation rather than undergo 
precautionary measures if the cost of those measures appears to be 
greater than the foreseeable cost of an accident.79 In this model, risk-
taking activity can be understood as a function of the benefit to the 
injuring party, the probability that the activity will cause harm, the 
degree of harm, and also the probability that the injuring party will be 
held liable.80 Let b be the benefit that accrues to the injurer from 
taking on a risky activity, p be the probability of harm, d be damages 
or the cost of the injury, and q be the probability that the injurer will 
be held liable. Under the Hand Rule, then, a defendant is liable if b < 
p · d, and a rational party will carry out a risky activity when she 
perceives that b > p · d · q.81 Conversely, under this model, a rational 
party will be deterred from carrying out a risky activity when she 
perceives that b < p · d · q. 
Figure 1 depicts the Hand Rule in its marginal form, with the 
horizontal axis representing units of care or precaution and the 
vertical axis representing price per unit.82 The curve marked b 
represents the marginal cost of units of care and is rising on the 
assumption that the marginal cost of units of care increases as 
additional units are bought.83 The curve marked pd represents the 
marginal change in expected accident costs, or marginal benefits, as 
more units of care are purchased. The curve has a negative slope on 
the assumption that additional units of care offer a diminishing return 
in actual accident prevention. The defendant will exercise due care at 	  
76 Cooter, supra note 26, at 14 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291–93 
(1965)). 
77 Schroeder, supra note 44, at 587. 
78 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
79 Id. at 173. 
80 Id. The probability that a risk-taker will be held liable includes the probability that 
the harm will be detected, the probability she will be sued, and the probability she will be 
punished. Hylton, supra note 57, at 519. 
81 KOLSTAD, supra note 19, at 384–85; POSNER, supra note 42, at 167–71; Cooter, 
supra note 26, at 15. 
82 KOLSTAD, supra note 19, at 230; POSNER, supra note 42, at 168–69; Metcalf, supra 
note 75, at 296–98. Firm actions can be expressed as level of care or, inversely, level of 
activity. Keith N. Hylton, The Economic Theory of Nuisance Law and Implications for 
Environmental Regulation, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 673, 677 (2008). 
83 “Units of care” may be safety protocols or practices, abatement techniques or 
technologies, or a downscale of risk-generating activity. 
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the intersection of the two curves, which is labeled c*, where the 
marginal costs of precaution are equal to the marginal benefits. To the 
left, the expected costs of harm are greater than the cost of avoiding 
them, and the defendant will be found liable; whereas to the right, the 
costs of avoiding accidents outweigh the benefits in avoiding them, 
and the defendant will not be held liable. 
Figure 1. The Hand Rule in Marginal Form 
  (As a Marginal Abatement Benefits / Costs Curve) 
 
Under the Hand Rule, liability standards can theoretically 
encourage private actors to internalize external costs by creating 
incentives for risk-averse—or at least risk-aware—behavior.84 Of 
course, excessive liability standards could over-deter risky activity 
while modest standards or imperfections in tort law’s deterrence 
signal could result in under-deterrence. The key is for the government 
to set liability standards that encourage private parties to take the 
socially optimal levels of risk and precaution. The deterrence theory, 
therefore, characterizes “liability law as a search for efficiency in 
incentives and risk-bearing.”85 Even when negligence standards alone 
do not quite achieve the optimal levels of risk and precaution, they 
may nonetheless be useful complements to regulation. 
	  
84 Abraham, supra note 5, at 390; Cane, supra note 17, at 446; Cooter, supra note 26, at 
12. 
85 Cooter, supra note 26, at 11. 
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3. Strict Liability 
Under a strict liability standard, a court may find a defendant liable 
regardless of whether she exercised reasonable care.86 Thus, whereas 
a negligence rule operates as a type of regulatory standard, strict 
liability functions more like a judicially imposed Pigouvian tax: the 
defendant must pay the penalty for every injury she causes.87 Strict 
liability, therefore, provides redress for harms caused by activities for 
which due care cannot mitigate the risk.88 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts applies strict liability to 
“abnormally dangerous activit[ies].”89 The exact requirements for 
finding an activity to be abnormally dangerous differ from state to 
state, but “in general the activity must pose significant foreseeable 
risk that cannot be eliminated even when reasonable care is exercised 
in the conduct of the activity.”90 Of the twenty-seven jurisdictions 
that have considered the application of strict liability to activities that 
caused environmental damage as of 2008, twenty-one have upheld the 
application.91 Examples include the contamination of water supplies 
and property by chemicals from oil and gas wells and industrial 
operations.92 
Strict liability is also incorporated into CERCLA as a means of 
increasing the likelihood that victims of hazardous waste leakage are 
compensated for their injuries. The following section includes a 
discussion of CERCLA as a statutory model as well as the general 
characteristics of environmental torts and issues raised by overlapping 
regulations. 	  
86 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977). For a discussion of strict liability 
in the environmental context, see JOHN S. APPLEGATE ET AL., THE REGULATION OF TOXIC 
SUBSTANCES AND HAZARDOUS WASTES 85–86 (2d ed. 2011); Adelman & Duncan, supra 
note 5, at 41–42; Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental Torts, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1, 58–61 
(1993); Marshall S. Shapo, Tort Law and Environmental Risk, 14 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 
531, 533–36 (1997). 
87 COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 14, at 287–307; Logue, supra note 4, at 2321–24. 
88 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 5, at 41–42. 
89 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(1) . 
90 Abraham, supra note 5, at 385. 
91 Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change and Carbon 
Sequestration: Assessing a Liability Regime for Long-Term Storage of Carbon Dioxide, 58 
EMORY L.J. 103, 142 (2008). 
92 Id.; see also Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Miller Oil Purchasing Co., 678 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 
1982) (disposal of waste into an oil pipeline); Albahary v. City & Town of Bristol, Conn., 
963 F. Supp. 150 (D. Conn. 1997) (landfill contamination); Valentine v. Pioneer Chlor 
Alkali Co., 864 P.2d 295 (Nev. 1993) (release of liquefied chlorine into the environment); 
Meiners & Yandle, supra note 23, at 937–38. 
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II 
LIABILITY IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT 
Tort law functions most effectively in paradigm cases, which 
“involve[] a single plaintiff suing a single defendant for a well-
documented and significant harm.”93 Environmental harm in the real 
world, however, is often not as straightforward as this paradigm case: 
injuries may not be well documented or significant, harm may be 
spread among a diffuse population, and the harm may have originated 
from many indeterminate risk takers. Subsection A discusses 
characteristics and transaction costs common to many environmental 
torts, revealing many of tort law’s limitations as an environmental 
policy instrument. Subsection B provides examples of how tort law 
can be appropriated to work within federal regulatory frameworks. 
Subsection C begins with a discussion of the legal issues that litigants 
face when tort law overlaps with regulatory policies. The subsection 
ends by showing the circumstances in which tort law can act as a 
complement to other policy tools. 
A. General Characteristics of Environmental Torts 
1. Long Latency of Harms 
The plaintiff must prove proximate causation by a preponderance 
of the evidence. To do so, the plaintiff must demonstrate that her 
injury was a foreseeable result of the defendant’s activity by showing 
that the defendant knew or should have known that her conduct could 
cause harm at the time the defendant carried out the harm-causing 
activity. Establishing causation for toxic tort plaintiffs is more 
complex given inherent uncertainties in the incidence of disease. A 
toxic tort plaintiff must rule out other causes of her disease, establish 
general causation by providing statistical (epidemiological) evidence 
that the defendant’s activity or product is capable of causing the 
plaintiff’s type of illness, and establish specific causation by 
providing the evidence that the defendant actually caused the 
plaintiff’s particular illness.94 Moreover, the nature of environmental 
torts is such that the causal connection between the plaintiff’s injury 
and the defendant’s conduct typically does not become apparent until 
	  
93 Schroeder, supra note 44, at 599. 
94 APPLEGATE ET AL., supra note 86, at 49–55. 
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after the plaintiff discovers the injury.95 In a paradigm case, it may be 
relatively simple for the plaintiff to show that the defendant should 
have known of the risk inherent in her conduct. 
In many instances of injury in the toxicological context, however, 
the harm is removed in both time and space from the defendant’s 
risky activity. First, it may take a great amount of time—perhaps 
years or even decades—for some substances to accumulate in the 
environment or people’s bodies to threshold amounts high enough to 
have an effect on human health.96 Second, even after exposure to a 
toxic substance, it may take decades for that exposure to manifest into 
a disease—e.g., cancer.97 Third, it may take an additional period of 
time from when an individual contracts a disease to when the disease 
becomes detectable and even more time for a proper diagnosis.98 
Finally, many diseases that result from exposure to harmful pollutants 
have other causes as well, and it is against these background rates of 
latent disease that plaintiffs must establish that the defendant’s 
conduct was the actual cause of injury.99 Thus, even after the years 
that it may take for a toxic pollutant to build up in the environment 
and the additional years it may take for exposure to generate a 
tangible injury in a single victim, it may take many more years for 
epidemiologists to collect data from a large enough sample of people 
upon which reliable studies can be based.100 
This long latency period between the conduct and the injury has 
several implications for the usefulness of tort law as an environmental 
policy tool. First, it may be very difficult for the plaintiff to discover, 
let alone establish by a preponderance of the evidence, the chain of 
events that led to the injury.101 In addition to having a long latency 
period, the defendant’s conduct may be removed in space from the 
victim’s exposure. To take drinking water contamination as an 	  
95 RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 114 (2004); 
Abraham, supra note 5, at 384; Brennan, supra note 88, at 21; Gifford, supra note 40, at 
615–16. 
96 See generally Marilena Kampa & Elias Castanas, Human Health Effects of Air 
Pollution, 151 ENVTL. POLLUTION 362 (2008); KOLSTAD, supra note 19, at 232–33; 
Adelman & Duncan, supra note 5, at 20; Shavell 1984, supra note 3, at 363. 
97 Abraham, supra note 5, at 30, 384; KOLSTAD, supra note 19, at 368–69. 
98 Abraham, supra note 5, at 380. 
99 Id. at 382; Schroeder, supra note 44, at 601–02. 
100 Abraham, supra note 5, at 384. 
101 Id. at 380–81; APPLEGATE ET AL., supra note 86, at 48–51; COLE & GROSSMAN, 
supra note 14, at 397; Czarneski & Thomsen, supra note 23, at 5; Daniel A. Farber, Toxic 
Causation, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1220 (1987); Hylton, supra note 57, at 517–18, 529; 
Menell, supra note 44, at 94–95, 99; Schroeder, supra note 44, at 592. 
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example, the defendant’s pollutant may have migrated through 
ground water aquifers before the plaintiff became exposed. 
Second, the defendant’s conduct may pre-date advances in medical 
science that establish the connection between the conduct and the 
harm. Consequently, it may be difficult for a plaintiff to prove the 
foreseeability element of proximate causation.102  In other words, it 
may not have been foreseeable to the defendant that her conduct 
could cause harm at the time she carried out the activity. 
One illustrative example is the case of Ethyl Corp. v. 
Environmental Protection Agency.103 In Ethyl, the plaintiff petroleum 
manufacturers challenged EPA’s health-based regulation of lead as a 
criteria air pollutant in the CAA.104 Plaintiffs argued that the 
regulation was arbitrary and capricious because medical science had 
not yet established the connection between lead air emissions and 
harmful concentration levels of lead in the bloodstream.105 The 
evidence, therefore, would not have sustained a tort action.106 
However, the court ruled for EPA, indicating that the statute did not 
require proof of actual harm for EPA to regulate.107 Although medical 
science established the causal connection years later, the risk of 
causing harm from using lead as a gasoline additive was not 
foreseeable to the manufacturers at the time they were using it. 
Third, certain claims may be barred by a statute of limitations. 
However, the statute of limitations in most jurisdictions does not 
begin to run until the injured person knows or should know that her 
injury was caused by exposure to a pollutant.108 Finally, scientific and 
medical proof is notoriously difficult, time-intensive, and costly to 
generate, regardless of the latency issue.109 
The long latency of harm resulting from environmental degradation 
also increases the likelihood of discovering an exposure before an 
injury materializes, raising the issue of inchoate losses.110 The 	  
102 Schroeder, supra note 44, at 601–02. 
103 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
104 Id. at 10–11. 
105 Id. at 11. 
106 Id. at 25. 
107 Id. at 17. 
108 Brennan, supra note 88, at 54–56; APPLEGATE ET AL., supra note 86, at 60. 
109 Abraham, supra note 5, at 381; Meiners & Yandle, supra note 23, at 930; 
Schroeder, supra note 44, at 592. 
110 Abraham, supra note 5, at 389–91; Meiners & Yandle, supra note 23, at 930–31; 
Robert L. Rabin, Environmental Liability and the Tort System, 24 HOUS. L. REV. 27, 29–
30 (1987). 
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injuries resulting from discovery of such an exposure, of course, are 
not entirely inchoate: fear of developing a future disease is a real loss, 
as are expenses associated with medical monitoring of an exposed 
population, even if the monitoring never reveals any disease.111  Some 
courts have discounted the traditional requirement that the plaintiff 
show a tangible physical harm and have provided for recovery under 
limited circumstances.112 
Inadequate recovery for inchoate losses may raise issues both in 
terms of tort law’s ability to provide for corrective justice and its 
capacity to deter risky behavior. “A party whose conduct imposes the 
risk of harm on others but who does not bear full liability for the harm 
ultimately caused by that conduct is suboptimally deterred.”113 The 
solution that some legal scholars have suggested is the establishment 
of a cause of action for the creation of risk.114 Recognition of such a 
tort is more or less implausible due to the practical and political issues 
that it raises,115 but it is an interesting concept nonetheless that 
highlights a shortcoming of the ability of liability law to fully address 
the creation of risk. 
2. Diffuse Harms: The Indeterminate Plaintiff and Multiple Victims 
In the paradigm case described above, “a single plaintiff su[es] a 
single defendant for a well-documented and substantial harm.”116 
Troyen Brennan and Christopher Schroeder describe this tort as a 
concentrated effect from a concentrated origin (as opposed to a 
diffuse effect from diffuse origins).117 This continuum of 
environmental and public health torts ranging from concentrated 
effects from concentrated origins to diffuse effects from diffuse 	  
111 Abraham, supra note 5, at 389; APPLEGATE ET AL., supra note 86, at 97–98. 
112 Abraham, supra note 5, at 389 (citing Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 
F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986), Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn. 
1986); Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993); Mauro v. 
Raymark Indus., Inc., 561 A.2d 257 (N.J. 1989); Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of the 
Army & Dep’t of Defense of the U.S., 696 A.2d 137 (Pa. 1997); Bower v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424 (W. Va. 1999)). 
113 Abraham, supra note 5, at 389; see also Adelman & Duncan, supra note 5, at 27–
30; Brennan, supra note 88, at 45–47, 61–64; Gifford, supra note 40, at 615–16; Rabin, 
supra note 110, at 43. 
114 Abraham, supra note 5, at 390–91. But see Mark Latham et al., The Intersection of 
Tort and Environmental Law: Where the Twains Should Meet and Depart, 80 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 737, 765 (2011) (criticizing risk-based liability). 
115 Abraham, supra note 5, at 390–91. 
116 Schroeder, supra note 44, at 599. 
117 Brennan, supra note 88, at 9–13; Schroeder, supra note 44, at 600. 
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origins is shown below in Figure 2. This diagram is a useful 
conceptual tool to aid in the understanding of the capacity of tort law 
to ameliorate environmental problems. 
Generally, tort standards are best equipped to address concentrated 
effects from concentrated origins. These suits do not necessarily 
involve only two parties; however, the injuries and parties are few and 
relatively easily identifiable. A typical concentrated effect from a 
concentrated origin would be a standard nuisance or negligence case 
in which the plaintiff can easily identify the harm and its source—for 
example, litigation for mesothelioma caused by exposure to 
asbestos.118 Many environmental externalities, however, do not fit 
that model. This subsection discusses the issues associated with 
diffuse effects, and the following subsection addresses the issues 
associated with harm from diffuse origins. 
  
	  
118 Schroeder, supra note 44, at 600; see generally Thomas O. McGarity, Beyond 
Buckman: Wrongful Manipulation of the Regulatory Process in the Law of Torts, 41 
WASHBURN L.J. 549, 570 (2002) [hereinafter McGarity 2002]. 
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*This diagram is adapted from Schroeder, supra note 44, at 600. The plotted points are not 
exact, but rather are approximations that are conceptually useful in showing how types of 
pollution (or typical torts in the case of trespass or nuisance) vary by concentration of origin and 
effect. 
Diffuse effects do not afflict single and discretely identifiable 
plaintiffs. Rather, they affect large populations of individuals—many 
of whom may not even know that they are affected—over wide 
geographic areas. What’s more, these environmental externalities may 
manifest in more than one way. Air pollution is the typical diffuse-
effect environmental externality. Whether from a concentrated source 
like a tall smokestack or from diffuse origins like mobile sources 
(e.g., automobiles), pollutants such as particulate matter, ozone, and 
sulfur dioxide impair the health of many millions by contributing to a 
range of respiratory, cardiovascular, and neurological diseases as well 
as multiple varieties of cancer.119 As noted in the prior subsection, 
many of these health impairments may develop over a course of 
years, and as a result, it can be quite a challenge—both scientifically 
and as a practical matter—to identify the source of the harm. 
The first difficulty associated with diffuse harm, therefore, is the 
so-called problem of the indeterminate plaintiff.120 Most of the 
varieties of diseases that develop from diffuse-harm environmental 	  
119 Bert Brunekreef & Stephen T. Holgate, Air Pollution and Health, 360 LANCET 1233 
(2002); Kampa & Castanas, supra note 96; Sangi, supra note 10, at 489–90. 
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contaminants also have other anthropogenic and natural causes. It 
falls on the plaintiff to show by a preponderance of the evidence that 
her injury more likely than not is the result of the actions of the 
defendant and cannot be attributed to some other cause. The 
indeterminate plaintiff, therefore, is “indeterminate” precisely because 
she cannot be certain that the defendant’s conduct is the cause-in-fact 
of her injury. The latency of the plaintiff’s illness confounds the 
problem: not only is it difficult to reconstruct the chain of events that 
led to the plaintiff’s injury over a course of years, but it is also 
difficult for the plaintiff to distinguish her own injury from the 
background rate of her disease.121  
The second challenge associated with diffuse-harm externalities is 
that they often affect a great number of individuals over an expansive 
geographic area. Tort law faces three primary difficulties in 
addressing diffuse-harm externalities. First, in certain cases, the 
aggregate damage of the pollution may be substantial, but the injury 
that any given individual suffers may be relatively small and will not 
rise to the level of a tort.122 Second, even if a victim’s harm does rise 
to the level of a tort, the transaction costs of litigation may be too 
great for that individual to decide to litigate.123 Finally, cases 
involving many potential plaintiffs may encounter a collective action 
problem.124 The transaction costs of litigation may be such that 
“[e]ach victim will have an incentive to wait for some other victim to 
bear the cost of bringing the first action.”125 In some instances, class 
actions are able to overcome these problems by aggregating the 
plaintiffs’ injuries.126 
3. Diffuse Origins: Multiple Tortfeasors 
Many environmental externalities do not originate from a single 
polluter, but rather are the result of pollution from many sources.127 It 
can often be difficult, therefore, for plaintiffs to determine which 	  
121 Abraham, supra note 5, at 382; Schroeder, supra note 44, at 601–02. 
122 Schroeder, supra note 44, at 600–01. 
123 Brennan, supra note 88, at 44–45; Schroeder, supra note 44, at 600–01. 
124 Stuart Buck, The Common Law and the Environment in the Courts, 58 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 621, 638 (2008); Hylton, supra note 57, at 518–19; Kaswan, supra note 68, 
at 100–01. 
125 Hylton, supra note 57, at 519. 
126 David Rosenberg, The Regulatory Advantage of Class Action, in REGULATION 
THROUGH LITIGATION 244 (W. Kip Viscusi ed. 2002); Metcalf, supra note 75, at 314–19. 
127 POSNER, supra note 42, at 63; Abraham, supra note 5, at 381; Brennan, supra note 
88, at 12–13. 
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polluter is the cause-in-fact of their injuries. This is the so-called 
problem of the indeterminate defendant.128 
Several doctrines of joint liability have emerged to ease the 
plaintiff’s burden of showing cause-in-fact in these situations.129 
Rules of joint liability functionally shift the burden of assigning 
proportionate fault to the defendants.130  A defendant who has been 
held liable and paid more than her fair share of the judgment may 
collect from other polluters under the theory of contribution (or partial 
equitable indemnity). This allows the defendant to compel other 
polluters to reimburse her for their fair share of the judgment, or 
under a theory of indemnity, to compel them to reimburse her for the 
entire amount of the judgment.131 The precise elements of 
contribution and indemnification differ among jurisdictions; however, 
indemnification generally requires the defendant to show that the 
other polluters are substantially more responsible for the plaintiff’s 
injury than the defendant is. By shifting the burden of showing 
proportionate fault to the polluters, joint liability rules improve the 
efficiency of liability entitlements because the polluters can most 
cheaply attain the information necessary to apportion fault for injuries 
from their environmental contamination.132 
It may nonetheless be relatively easier for a plaintiff to win a 
judgment employing one of these theories in a products liability case 
than in a toxic tort suit. Identifying the gamut of manufacturers of a 
given product is a relatively simple task. On the other hand, 
identifying the responsible parties of diffuse-origin environmental 
externalities is relatively difficult. Examples of diffuse-origin 
environmental pollution range from groundwater contamination and 
Superfund sites (concentrated effects) to mobile source air pollution 	  
128 KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW: AN 
ANALYTICAL PRIMER ON CASES AND CONCEPTS 108–14 (1997); Abraham, supra note 5, 
at 381; see also Boyer & Porrini, supra note 1, at 246; Gifford, supra note 40, at 616–17; 
Rabin, supra note 110, at 29. 
129 The four varieties are joint and several liability, alternative liability, market share 
liability, and proportionate share or contribution rules. 
130 Schroeder, supra note 44, at 601. 
131 See, e.g., Dowie v. Fleishman-Hillard Inc., 422 Fed. App’x 627, 629-30 (9th Cir. 
2011); W. Steamship Lines, Inc. v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 876 P.2d 1062, 1066–68 
(Cal. 1994); Am. Motorcycle Assoc. v. Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 578 P.2d 899, 903–
06 (Cal. 1978). 
132 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1096–97; see generally Summers v. Tice, 
199 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1948) (“Ordinarily defendants are in a far better position to offer 
evidence to determine which one caused the injury.”); CALABRESI, supra note 38, at 69–
73, 135–97; EPSTEIN, supra note 26, at 136, 644. 
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from automobiles (diffuse effects). Schroeder argues that “diffuse 
effects from diffuse origins[] pose the greatest challenges for tort.”133  
This model explains why environmental advocates have so far been 
unsuccessful in convincing a court to hold carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emitters liable for climate change damages under a liability theory.134 
Carbon dioxide emissions are the archetype diffuse-effect/diffuse-
origin externality: even if a plaintiff establishes general causation by 
showing that she suffered an injury directly from CO2 emissions, it 
would be nigh impossible for her to establish specific causation by 
showing that it was the defendant’s CO2 emissions that caused the 
harm. Although liability rules have emerged to assist plaintiffs in 
holding multiple defendants accountable for an injury, tort law may 
not be the best tool available to address diffuse-effect/diffuse-origin 
externalities. Congress elected, however, to employ liability to 
address a major diffuse-origin environmental problem by enacting 
CERCLA. The next subsections discuss statutory appropriation of 
liability rules. 
B. Statutory Models 
1. Strict Liability: CERCLA 
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 in response to decades of 
improper disposal of hazardous substances from industrial 
activities.135 CERCLA provides a cost-recovery mechanism for the 
federal government, state governments, and private parties who must 
incur remediation costs related to the release of hazardous 
substances.136  Under CERCLA’s liability machinery, any government 
or private entity may sue a responsible “person” to recover “response 
costs” resulting from any “release” of a “hazardous substance” from a 
	  
133 Schroeder, supra note 44, at 601; see also Brennan, supra note 88, at 44–45. 
134 See Latham et al., supra note 114, at 759–63; Laurence H. Tribe et al., Too Hot for 
the Courts to Handle: Fuel Temperatures, Global Warming, and the Political Question 
Doctrine (Wash. Legal Found. Critical Legal Issues, Working Paper No. 169, 2010), 
available at http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/workingpaper/012910Tribe_wp.pdf. 
But see Czarnezki & Thomsen, supra note 23, at 12–18 (evaluating the capacity of tort law 
to address climate change); Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort 
Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1 (2011) (discussing how tort law might adapt as it is applied to 
climate change). 
135 Klass & Wilson, supra note 91, at 128. 
136 Id. The Oil Pollution Act also establishes a liability standard to address claims 
arising from oil spills. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–62 (2006); Latham et al., supra note 114, at 771. 
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“facility.”137 Section 107(a) provides for strict liability.138 The 
causation inquiry is reduced to whether the release of the hazardous 
substance caused the plaintiff to incur a response cost—an expense 
incurred in investigation and remediation.139 CERCLA also applies 
retroactive and joint and several liability to any identifiable 
“potentially responsible parties.”140 If plaintiffs can identify the 
parties responsible for contamination, plaintiffs may hold them liable 
for past and future remediation costs as well as the cost of 
preventative measures. If the responsible parties cannot be identified, 
or if the identifiable parties are insolvent, then the government may 
finance the remedial and preventative cleanup efforts of these 
“orphan” sites through CERCLA’s trust fund, known as the 
Superfund.141  
In designing the liability framework of CERCLA, the government 
explicitly decided to rely on liability entitlements in addition to pubic 
regulation. In the context of the hazardous waste problem, this 
decision made sense. The government does not have full information 
on which hazardous waste sites are causing problems, and it would be 
too burdensome on regulators to monitor the more than 1,000 sites 
throughout the nation.142 Reliance on private enforcement solves this 
efficiency problem by facilitating suits from individuals with 
information on the nature and extent of the injury, while joint and 
several liability places the burden of apportioning fault on the parties 
most likely to have that information.143 Though CERCLA’s liability 
rule is not perfect,144 it nonetheless shows how legislators can 
marshal the strengths of liability entitlements to make up for the 
shortcomings of other policy tools. 
	  
137 42 U.S.C. § 9601(1) (defining “person,” “response,” “release,” “hazardous 
substance,” and “facility,” among others). 
138 § 9607; see also APPLEGATE ET AL., supra note 86, at 512. 
139 See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 264–66 (3d Cir. 1992); 
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167–69 (4th Cir. 1988); New York v. Shore 
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042–48 (2d Cir. 1985); APPLEGATE ET AL., supra note 86, 
at 512; Klass & Wilson, supra note 91, at 128–30. 
140 APPLEGATE ET AL., supra note 86, at 513–22. 
141 Klass & Wilson, supra note 91, at 131. 
142 National Priorities List, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/superfund 
/sites/npl/index.htm (last updated Oct. 17, 2012). 
143 See Logue, supra note 4, at 2320–21. 
144 See generally Menell, supra note 44, at 105–10 (critiquing CERCLA). 
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2. Limited Liability: Price-Anderson 
The generation of nuclear power is one activity that receives a 
degree of protection from liability. The Price-Anderson Act of 1957 
establishes a framework for compensation to the injured parties in the 
case of a nuclear accident.145  Under the Act, owners of commercial 
nuclear power plants must assume liability and waive most legal 
defenses for damages from nuclear accidents.146 However, the Act 
limits that liability through an insurance program and liability cap. 
The maximum amount that nuclear reactor owners would have to pay 
for a nuclear accident in the United States is $375 million in insurance 
coverage plus an additional $117.5 million, per nuclear reactor. There 
are 104 commercial nuclear reactors, leaving the total maximum 
payout at about $12.6 billion.147 
The issue of liability for a nuclear accident has received increased 
attention recently due to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear meltdown in 
March 2011.148 The disaster in Japan highlights the fact that the 
damage from a nuclear accident may exceed Price-Anderson’s $12.6 
billion liability cap.149  In spite of the Fukushima incident, nuclear 
power will likely play a noteworthy part in the solution to climate 
change and the rising worldwide demand for electricity.150 In fact, 	  
145 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2006); see also M.A. de Figueiredo et al., Framing the Long-
Term In Situ Liability Issue for Geologic Carbon Storage in the United States, 10 
MITIGATION & ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 647, 652 (2005). 
146 MARK HOLT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY, 15 (2011), 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33558.pdf. 
147 Id. 
148 See Mark Cooper, Nuclear Liability: The Market-Based, Post-Fukushima Case for 
Ending Price-Anderson, BULL. OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Oct. 5, 2011), http://thebulletin 
.org/nuclear-liability-market-based-post-fukushima-case-ending-price-anderson; Ellen 
Vancko, Nuclear Energy & Climate Change Project Manager, Union of Concerned 
Scientists, Address at the Center for Strategic and International Studies: The Impact of 
Fukushima on the US Nuclear Power Industry (Apr. 7, 2011) (transcript available at 
http://csis.org/files/attachments/110407_vancko_nuclear_safety_0.pdf). 
149 HOLT, supra note 146, at 16; Vancko, supra note 148, at 5; Noah Shachtman, 
Pentagon Quake Nightmare: Fukushima on the Mississippi, WIRED.COM (Aug. 24, 2011, 
6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/08/quake-nightmare; Rebecca Smith 
& Mark Maremont, Earthquake Risks Probed at U.S. Nuclear Plants, WALL ST. J., July 
19, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303795304576453842 
076898316. 
150 David Pumphrey & Jane Nakano, Nuclear Power After Fukushima, in CENTER FOR 
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., GLOBAL FORECAST 2011: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN A 
TIME OF UNCERTAINTY 79–81 (Craig Cohen & Josiane Gabel eds., 2011), available at 
http://csis.org/files/publication/110610_Cohen_GlobalForecast2011.pdf; Michael G. Faure 
& Karine Fiore, An Economic Analysis Of The Nuclear Liability Subsidy, 26 PACE ENVTL. 
L. REV. 419, 420 (2009); Vancko, supra note 148. 
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nuclear power accounted for about nineteen percent of the United 
States’ electricity generation in 2011.151 
The Price-Anderson liability cap was instrumental in facilitating 
the development of the commercial nuclear power industry in the late 
1950s.152 Fears of liability would likely have otherwise driven away 
the investors essential to the development and deployment of nuclear 
power generation in the United States. Indeed, liability rules do not 
only impact how careful an individual will be in carrying out an 
activity; sometimes they determine whether the individual will engage 
in the activity at all. The appropriate liability rule will encourage 
nuclear power operators to generate the socially optimal amount of 
electricity from their reactors while internalizing the cost of the 
socially optimal level of precaution.153 The Price-Anderson Act may 
not precisely result in the optimal amount of nuclear power, but it 
nonetheless illustrates an instance in which the government chose to 
limit liability to facilitate a somewhat risky but socially beneficial 
activity. 
C. Regulatory Overlap with Tort Law 
Much of the literature on environmental policy instrument choice 
suggests that policymakers must decide between regulation and the 
free market. This approach ignores the pre-existence of tort remedies 
to environmental problems. Indeed, Posner explains: 
The choice is rarely between a free market and public regulation. It 
is between two methods of public control—the common law system 
of privately enforced rights and the administrative system of direct 
public control—and should depend on a weighing of their strengths 
and weaknesses in particular contexts.154 
This choice has six possible outcomes. The default outcome occurs 
when the government makes no choice at all. Without any actual 
policymaking, the government functionally “chooses” to rely on the 
tort law system as it is. The next five outcomes, when the government 
does engage in a policy decision, exist along a continuum, with 
limited liability on one extreme and strict liability on the other. The 
first policy outcome is to limit liability, as the United States has done 	  
151 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY 1 (Aug. 16, 2011), 
available at http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/current_year/august2011.pdf. 
152 HOLT, supra note 146, at 16. 
153 Faure & Fiore, supra note 150, at 420–22. 
154 POSNER, supra note 42, at 389. 
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with the nuclear power industry in Price-Anderson. Second, the 
government could decide to limit liability in addition to regulatory 
standard setting. In fact, the full body of regulations governing 
nuclear power generation in the United States more closely resembles 
this second outcome than the first. The third option is to regulate 
alone without any explicit change to liability standards. An example 
would be the CAA, compliance with which does not relieve a polluter 
from state tort law. The fourth option is to regulate and enhance the 
liability system. The cradle-to-grave regulatory system governing 
hazardous wastes as a whole, embodied in RCRA and CERCLA, is an 
example of this fourth option. Taken alone, though, CERCLA’s 
liability rule is also an example of the fifth outcome whereby the 
government does not regulate, but only enhances liability standards. 
The typology of these outcomes is expressed as a continuum in Figure 
3 below. 
 
Figure 3. Policy Decision Outcomes of Liability Entitlement 





*Default, No Decision Outcome: Reliance on Liability Law 
Whereas the Price-Anderson Act and CERCLA both overtly 
change liability rules, the government often enacts legislation with 
little (and in some instances, without any) explicit mention of the 
regulation’s effect on liability entitlements. The following subsections 
briefly address the possible effects of regulatory overlap with the 
subject matter of the litigation on the outcomes of tort suits. The first 
three subsections specifically address the legal issues that arise from 
the overlap between federal statutes and state liability laws. The 
fourth section addresses the regulation redundancy that occurs when 
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1. Preemption 
The law of torts is almost entirely state law.155  If pollutants do not 
cross state boundaries, then the application of state law is, of course, 
natural. Toxic substances in emissions and effluents, though, 
frequently cross state lines. Prior to a series of U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions in 1981, federal courts enforced a body of federal common 
law to govern nuisance actions between states.156 In City of 
Milwaukee v. Illinois and Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. 
National Sea Clammers Association, however, the Court held that the 
comprehensive scope of the Clean Water Act (CWA) preempted the 
application of the federal common law of nuisance to effluent 
discharges into navigable waters.157 Recently, the Court held that the 
CAA also preempts federal public nuisance claims against carbon 
dioxide emitters contributing to climate change.158 Many recent cases 
hold that the CAA preempts state tort law, relying on the Court’s 
decision in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette.159 There, the Court 
clarified its doctrine on the preemption of state tort law regarding 
cross-state pollution.160 In Ouellette, however, the Court preserved 
state nuisance actions brought under the state law of the pollution 
source.161 In the context of effluent discharges and the emission of 
criteria air pollutants, then, source state law controls in nuisance 
actions, whether the pollutants cross state borders or not. In certain 
instances, though, comprehensive federal statutes may nevertheless 
preempt the application of state nuisance law. 
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution162 empowers 
Congress with the authority to preempt state regulation and common 
law concerning any activity that Congress has the authority to 
	  
155 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 41, at 1. 
156 Sangi, supra note 11, at 501. 
157 Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 22 
(1981); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981); Alexandra B. Klass, 
Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory State, 92 IOWA L. REV. 545, 
563–64, 575–76 (2007) [hereinafter Klass 2007]; Meiners & Yandle, supra note 23, at 
953–54; Sangi, supra note 11, at 502. 
158 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
159 479 U.S. 481 (1987); see, e.g., Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, No. 12-4216, 
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 17283 (3d Cir. Aug. 20, 2013); North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. 
Tenn. Valley Auth. (TVA), 615 F.3d 291, 303 (4th Cir. 2010). 
160 Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 499–500. 
161 Id.; see also Klass 2007, supra note 157, at 564–65; Sangi, supra note 11, at 512. 
162 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl 2.  
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regulate.163 Whether or not a federal statute preempts a state’s 
liability rules is a matter of statutory interpretation.164 In making a 
determination on preemption, a court may find that a federal statute 
expressly or impliedly preempts state or local law.165 If the statute 
includes a provision that specifically bars the application of state law 
in particular instances, then a court may find express preemption.166 
In the absence of an express preemption clause, a court must 
determine whether the federal law impliedly preempts state law.167 
The Court outlined its precedent on implied preemption in 
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick: 
[A] federal statute implicitly overrides state law either when the 
scope of a statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to 
occupy a field exclusively, or when state law is in actual conflict 
with federal law. We have found implied conflict pre-emption 
where it is “impossible for a private party to comply with both state 
and federal requirements,” or where state law “stands as an obstacle 
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.”168 
In deciding whether a comprehensive federal statute impliedly 
preempts state liability rules, then, a court could find preemption if 
tort suits would interfere with the realization of policy objectives set 
out in the statute.169 In an effort to preserve the traditional police 
powers of the states, though, the Court has found for a presumption 
against preemption.170 Therefore, courts should require relatively 
express statutory language in order to find that a federal statute 
preempts state liability laws. 
In the context of hazardous substances, effluent discharges into 
navigable waters, and the emission of criteria air pollutants, Congress 
has carved out a role for state liability law. Indeed, CERCLA, the 	  
163 See generally Abraham, supra note 5, at 392–93 (discussing preemption in the 
context of environmental torts); Logue, supra note 4, at 2345–48 (discussing federal 
preemption of state tort laws).   
164 Abraham, supra note 5, at 392. 
165 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 392–93 
(3d ed. 2006); EPSTEIN, supra note 26, at 769. 
166 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 
U.S. 190, 203–04 (1983). 
167 Id.; Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995).  
168 514 U.S. at 287 (citations omitted).  
169 EPSTEIN, supra note 26, at 769. 
170 Abraham, supra note 5, at 392–93; Thomas O. McGarity, Regulation and 
Litigation: Complementary Tools for Environmental Protection, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
371, 395–96 (2005) [hereinafter McGarity 2005].  
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CWA, and the CAA all contain “savings clauses,” which preserve 
lawsuits under state liability laws.171  Section 505(e) of the CWA 
reads: “Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any 
person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common 
law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to 
seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a 
State agency).”172 Section 304(e) of the CAA is nearly identical,173 
and CERCLA’s savings clause states that “[n]othing in this chapter 
shall be construed or interpreted as preempting any State from 
imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect to the 
release of hazardous substances within such State.”174 It is clear, then, 
from the plain language of the statutes (as well as the statutes’ 
legislative histories and case law interpreting these provisions) that 
Congress designed these regulations to provide a floor of minimum 
requirements that industry must meet, and state regulations and 
liability laws may impose stricter obligations.175 
The presence of savings clauses necessarily rules out the possibility 
that CERCLA, the CWA, and the CAA expressly preempt state 
liability law.176 Furthermore, the provisions also demonstrate that 
Congress did not intend to occupy the field with any of these statutes. 
The only potential for these statutes to preempt state liability laws, 
therefore, rests in the area of conflict preemption.177 It is almost never 
impossible for a private party to comply with both state liability laws 
and federal requirements. The only remaining question, then, is 
whether the application of state liability entitlements would present an 
obstacle to the realization of federal statutory objectives. Usually, 
state liability remedies pass this test, though in several recent cases, 
	  
171 See Meiners & Yandle, supra note 23, at 953–54. 
172 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (2006). 
173 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e); see also Sangi, supra note 11, at 503. 
174 § 9614(a); see also Czarnezki & Thomsen, supra note 23, at 10–11. 
175 See Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 506 (1987); Bell v. Cheswick 
Generating Station, No. 12-4216, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 17283, at *13–23, *27–28 (3d 
Cir. Aug 20, 2013); Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario v. Detroit 
(Ontario), 874 F.2d 332, 342 (6th Cir. 1989); Buzbee, supra note 19, at 1586–89; 
Czarnezki & Thomsen, supra note 23, at 8–10; McGarity 2005, supra note 170, at 395–96; 
Sangi, supra note 11, at 515. 
176 Ontario, 874 F.2d at 342; Bell, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 17283, at *13–23, *27–28; 
Butler, supra note 14, at 731–37; Sangi, supra note 11, at 511–12. 
177 Sangi, supra note 11, at 511–12. 
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courts have found conflicts to exist.178 These decisions highlight the 
need for greater clarity in savings clauses.179 
When a court finds that a federal statute does preempt state or local 
law pertaining to a certain activity, victims of harm from that activity 
may not find recourse within state tort law; rather, the regulatory 
regime alone provides penalties for statutory violations in the 
preempted area. The Price-Anderson Act, for example, preempts state 
liability laws in the case of a nuclear accident.180 Recourse and 
payment for damages is prescribed by Price-Anderson’s insurance 
and retrospective premiums mechanisms, and damages beyond the 
$12.6 billion liability cap are preempted.181 Price-Anderson may also 
preempt smaller tort actions for injuries resulting from radiation 
exposure.182 
Statutory schemes that preempt state tort actions without creating 
an alternative federal liability standard resemble outcome 2 on the 
typology displayed in Figure 3 above. The statute would establish 
regulatory mechanisms for reducing the likelihood of harm from the 
regulated activity and prescribe penalties for violations of the statute. 
Liability under state law, however, would be functionally limited. 
2. Compliance as a Defense or as Evidence 
For regulations governing an activity that does not preempt liability 
claims, defendants may nonetheless escape liability in certain 
situations by claiming their compliance with those regulations as a 
defense.183  In other words, whereas preemption bars state tort 
litigation outright as a matter of statutory purpose, a court may 
recognize regulatory compliance as a defense as a matter of statutory 
purpose or of its own decision.184 Additionally, the availability of the 	  
178 See, e.g., North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth. (TVA), 615 F.3d 291 
(4th Cir. 2010); United States v. EME Homer City Generation L.P., 823 F. Supp. 2d 274 
(W.D. Penn. 2011); Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 903 F. Supp. 2d 314 (W.D. 
Penn. 2012); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849 (S.D. Miss. 2012); see 
also Czarnezki & Thomsen, supra note 23, at 10–11 (discussing instances in which 
CERCLA preempts state liability rules). But see Barrella, supra note 11; Sangi, supra note 
11. 
179 Buzbee, supra note 19, at 1591. 
180 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2006). 
181 HOLT, supra note 146. 
182 Price-Anderson, Nuclear Power Plant Owner Avers Common-Law Claims 
Preempted, in 19, vol. 7 MEALEY’S EMERGING TOXIC TORTS 28–29 (July 6, 2010). 
183 Cane, supra note 17, at 462–63; Buzbee supra note 19, at 1582–85; Logue, supra 
note 4, at 2338–39; Meiners & Yandle, supra note 23, at 952. 
184 Abraham, supra note 5, at 393. 
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compliance defense does not preclude tort claims for statutory or 
regulatory violations; whereas if a statute preempts state tort actions, 
then victims of what would otherwise be a tort may not bring a claim 
even if the would-be defendant violated the terms of the preempting 
statute.185 That is, “[t]he defense applies only when there has been 
compliance.”186 
As a practical matter, few courts have found regulatory compliance 
to be a defense in a tort action, and few statutes provide for the 
defense.187  Courts in most states, however, do admit showings of 
compliance with a relevant regulation or statute as evidence in 
liability actions.188  In these instances, compliance may weigh in the 
defendant’s favor, but the trier of fact (usually a jury) is free to find 
that the defendant breached a duty of care above the floor established 
by the statute.189 The implication, then, is that most regulations either 
preempt state tort actions or establish a floor of minimum safety 
requirements, allowing tort liability to set safety standards that rise 
above the floor.190 This places the regulatory compliance defense at 
some point between outcome 2 and 3 along the decision continuum in  
The use of regulatory compliance as a defense (and even as 
evidence) is a contentious issue that invokes many of the arguments 
for and against tort law as a policy instrument. As a purely legal 
matter though, it is most appropriate to conclude that compliance with 
a federal regulation should not even be admitted as evidence in state 
tort trials because, absent a finding of preemption, compliance with a 
federal regulation is irrelevant to the narrow question of whether or 
not a defendant violated state tort law.191  Many states have in fact 	  
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 393–94; see also Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 345 (2008) (“Most 
States do not treat regulatory compliance as dispositive, but regard it as one factor to be 
taken into account by the jury.”); Frank B. Cross, Common Law Conceits: A Comment on 
Meiners & Yandle, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 965, 967–69 (1999); Robert L. Rabin, 
Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049, 2069 (2000); Catherine M. 
Sharkey, Federalism in Action: FDA Regulatory Preemption in Pharmaceutical Cases in 
State Versus Federal Courts, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1013, 1024 (2007). 
188 See, e.g., Riegel, 552 U.S. at 345; Brokaw v. Davol Inc., C.A. No. 07-3666, 2009 
R.I. Super. LEXIS 46, at *15–16 (May 15, 2009); see also Abraham, supra note 5, at 394–
95. 
189 Abraham, supra note 5, at 394–95. 
190 Id. at 394. 
191 See, e.g., Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, No. 12-4216, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 
17283, at *13–23 (3d Cir. Aug. 20, 2013); Ontario, 874 F.2d 332, 344-45 (6th Cir. 1989); 
Galaxy Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Massengill, 338 S.E.2d 428, 429–30 (Ga. 1986); Vill. of 
Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824, 837 (Ill. 1981); Neal v. Darby, 318 
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codified this principle in different ways. Alabama’s nuisance statute, 
for example, declares, “[t]he fact that the act done may otherwise be 
lawful does not keep it from being a nuisance.”192 
3. Non-Compliance as Negligence per se 
Even though most states and courts have concluded that regulatory 
compliance is not dispositive, they have established that the “violation 
of a health or safety statute or regulation is negligent ‘per se’—that is, 
negligent as a matter of law.”193 Compliance does not necessarily 
mean that state tort law standards of care have been met, but 
noncompliance can be negligent. A plaintiff must generally show four 
elements to successfully claim negligence per se194: (1) that the 
defendant violated a statute or regulation; (2) that the statute or 
regulation is designed to protect against the harm that occurred; (3) 
that the violation is the proximate cause of the harm; and (4) that the 
plaintiff is in the class of persons the statute or regulation is designed 
to protect. 
The American Law Institute has incorporated this principle into the 
Third Restatement of Torts.195 Whereas preemption and the 
regulatory compliance defense are often matters of statutory 
interpretation, the doctrine of negligence per se is a common law 
doctrine. Although some statutes do incorporate clauses specifying 
that noncompliance resulting in harm triggers civil liability,196 courts 
may find that non-compliance is negligent even without such a clause 
simply because violation of a statute or regulation “is negligence 
	  
S.E.2d 18, 23 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984); Czarnezki & Thomsen, supra note 23, at 24–26; 
Charlie Garlow, Environmental Recompense, 1 APPALACHIAN J.L. 1, 9, 17 (2002). 
192 ALA. CODE § 6-5-120 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Regular Sess.). 
193 ABRAHAM, supra note 128, at 79; Abraham, supra note 5, at 394; see also Buzbee, 
supra note 19, at 1582; Cross, supra note 187, at 969; Klass 2007, supra note 157, at 584–
85; Logue, supra note 4, at 2339–40; Thomas O. McGarity, The Complementary Roles of 
Common Law Courts and Federal Agencies in Producing and Using Policy-Relevant 
Scientific Information, 37 ENVTL. L. 1027, 1050 (2007) [hereinafter McGarity 2007]. In a 
minority of jurisdictions, statutory violation is not negligence per se, but is admissible as 
evidence. Abraham, supra note 5, at 395. 
194 See, e.g., Brown v. Shyne, 151 N.E. 197, 198 (N.Y. 1926). 
195 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§14 (2011). 
196 See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 669(a) (West 1995) (“The failure of a person to 
exercise due care is presumed if: (1) He violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a 
public entity . . . .”); EPSTEIN, supra note 26, at 229. 
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itself.”197  In other words, the statute or regulation establishes a duty 
and standard of care, and non-compliance constitutes a breach of that 
duty.198 
In the context of environmental policy, the negligence per se 
doctrine would appear between outcomes 3 and 4 on the decision 
typology in Figure 3 because the statute establishes a minimum 
requirement for due care, violation of which may constitute automatic 
negligence. Kenneth Abraham notes, however, that plaintiffs have not 
enjoyed widespread success asserting the negligence per se doctrine 
in the environmental context, explaining that there are just as many 
cases that apply the doctrine as those that reject it.199 One possible 
explanation for the lack of cases in which a plaintiff successfully 
asserts negligence per se is that businesses on balance abide by 
regulatory rules. An alternative explanation, which Abraham 
suggests, is that it may be quite burdensome for an attorney to prove a 
statutory violation.200 Plaintiffs’ attorneys, therefore, may prefer to 
dodge potentially complex regulatory compliance issues in favor of 
asserting more traditional tort law claims.201 This may be a more 
fruitful strategy if regulations do in fact only set a floor of minimum 
safety requirements, and liability standards of care may be more 
rigorous. 
4. Redundant Regulation 
The prior subsections all address legal issues that arise from the 
overlap between federal statutes and state liability laws. This 
subsection, on the other hand, addresses the economics of overlap 
between liability entitlements and public regulations. Indeed, if an 
action violates both regulatory requirements and tort standards of 
care, then a tortfeasor may not only be held liable in private litigation, 
but may also be subject to regulatory sanctions. Susan Rose-
Ackerman and Peter Cane call this “double jeopardy,”202 while Kyle 	  
197 Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (N.Y. 1920); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 26, 
at 233; Abraham, supra note 5, at 394. 
198 Osborne v. McMasters, 41 N.W. 543 (Minn. 1889); EPSTEIN, supra note 26, at 229. 
199 Abraham, supra note 5, at 395. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 Cane, supra note 17, at 461–62; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Public Law Versus Private 
Law in Environmental Regulation: European Union Proposals in the Light of United 
States Experience, 4 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 312, 315 (1995). Double 
jeopardy is not an “outcome” of an environmental policy instrument choice, as the term 
outcome is employed here. The government may not choose double jeopardy in the way 
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Logue refers to the problem as “redundant regulation.”203 Redundant 
regulation is a potential effect of any overlap between tort standards 
and regulatory rules. 
Some assert that redundant regulation is problematic when “the tort 
standard is higher than the regulatory standard”204—in other words, 
where the regulatory standard sets a floor of minimum standards that 
the tort law duty of care rises above. Rose-Ackerman suggests that a 
higher tort standard could supersede a regulatory rule if individuals 
aim to achieve that higher standard in an attempt to meet both; but she 
does not believe this is necessarily a problem.205 Cane, though, raises 
two objections. First, he argues that it is simply not fair to expose 
polluters to double liability.206 Cane concedes, though, that the 
corrective justice function of tort law would override his concerns to 
create a fair playing field for polluters.207 Second, he and others 
suggest that exposing polluters to redundant regulation could result in 
over-precaution and/or over-deterrence of what is presumably a 
socially desirable activity, ultimately generating inefficiency and 
deadweight loss in the market.208 This is a valid objection, though 
over-deterrence, which places the risk of liability on the risk takers, 
may be more desirable than under-deterrence, which spreads the cost 
of that risk to other parts of the economy.209 
Moreover, critics of redundant regulation are wrong, or at least 
incomplete, because they blindly assume that the regulatory rules 
would be set to achieve and actually achieve the socially optimal 
level of care—and that is highly unlikely to be the case. More 
accurately, redundant regulation will only result in inefficiency when 
the combined effects of the tort standard and the regulatory rule 
encourage precaution beyond the socially optimal level of care.210 
	  
that it may choose strict liability, a liability cap, preemption, or the regulatory compliance 
defense. 
203 Logue, supra note 4, at 2316. 
204 Cane, supra note 17, at 461. 
205 Rose-Ackerman, supra note 202. 
206 Cane, supra note 17, at 461–62. 
207 Id.; see also Logue, supra note 4, at 2333–34 (“[I]f corrective justice through tort 
law is something society cares about, then the administrative costs of running the tort 
system in this example are not duplicative at all.”). 
208 Cane, supra note 17, at 462; Logue, supra note 4, at 2332–33. 
209 Anthony Z. Roisman et al., Preserving Justice: Defending Toxic Tort Litigation, 15 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 191, 225 (2004). 
210 Logue, supra note 4, at 2332. 
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Kolstad et al. make this very point,211 and it should be apparent. 
Cane, though, seems to approach the problem from the wrong 
direction. Both he and Kyle Logue, presumably working from a blank 
policy instrument slate, seem to envision enacting a regulatory rule in 
a market without any pre-existing liability standards and ask what to 
do about civil liability. 
Posner and Kolstad et al., on the other hand, explain that liability 
standards will pre-date the establishment of regulatory rules in the 
United States.212 The appropriate way to approach the choice of a 
liability entitlement versus a regulatory rule, then, is to ask: given the 
liability standards in place, should the government establish a 
regulatory rule, and/or should it alter the tort standards? Kolstad et al. 
take this approach, and in so doing, they address the redundant 
regulation issue.213 Redundant regulation would result in over-
protection where the tort standard is higher than the regulatory 
standard and where the regulatory standard actually achieves the 
socially optimal level of care: 
[W]hen tort liability rules are in place, it is inefficient to set ex ante 
regulatory standards at the socially optimal level (where marginal 
costs of precaution equal the expected marginal benefits). The only 
instances when the ex ante regulatory standard should be set at the 
social optimum are when there is no ex post liability or, 
equivalently, when there is a zero probability of a judgment against 
a rational injurer under ex post liability.214 
That is, if there is a non-zero chance of ex post liability despite 
regulatory compliance, and the regulatory rule is set to achieve and 
actually achieves the socially optimal level of care, then naturally the 
addition of the two yields a sum of protection greater than the social 
optimum.215 
This effect is displayed in marginal form below in Figure 4. The 
curve labeled MC represents the social marginal costs of precaution, 
or units of care, and the curve marked MB represents the social 	  
211 Kolstad et al., supra note 5, at 900. 
212 POSNER, supra note 42, at 389; Kolstad et al., supra note 5, at 889. 
213 Kolstad et al., supra note 5, at 889. 
214 Id. 
215 The analysis by Kolstad et al. may be incomplete. The regulatory standard does not 
necessarily need to be set to achieve the socially optimal level of care for the combined 
effect of the regulatory and common law standards to generate over-precaution. The 
regulatory standard could foreseeably be set to achieve a level of care lower than the social 
optimum and still result in deadweight loss if the combined effect of the regulatory and 
liability standards encourages a level of precaution greater than is socially optimal. 
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marginal precaution benefits. The regulatory rule rr* is set to achieve 
the socially optimal level of care, and ls* represents the units of care 
achieved by the pre-existing liability standard. The combination of the 
units of care generated by the two standards, total precaution, is 
represented by tp*, which clearly results in inefficiency due to over-
precaution. 
Figure 4. The Redundant Regulation Problem in Marginal Form 
 
Here, the ex post liability standard is higher than the ex ante 
regulatory rule. However, even though the liability standard is set 
higher, the actual units of care that the tort law achieves are lower 
because of the imperfections inherent to tort law’s enforcement and 
deterrence signal (hence the need for a regulatory rule in the first 
place). The regulatory rule is set to achieve the socially optimal level 
of care, and as a theoretical matter, this model assumes that the 
regulation accomplishes this objective. The combination of the two 
standards results in a total precaution level of tp*; however, the exact 
location of tp* is indeterminate. Were this a typical marginal analysis, 
tp* would be equal to the sum of ls* and rr* along the x-axis. In this 
model, though, tp* is less than the sum of its parts because simply 
adding the units of care that each standard achieves would double 
count some units of care. That is, some of the units of care that the ex 
post liability standard generates and some of the units of care that the 
ex ante regulatory rule generates are the same units. 
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In Figure 4, tp* represents the combined effect of ls* and rr* only 
because the tort law standard of care is higher than the regulatory 
rule. If, on the other hand, the tort standard were lower than or equal 
to the regulatory rule, then the liability standard would functionally 
become immaterial because in meeting the higher regulatory rule, 
risk-takers would satisfy the tort law duty of care. An example of this 
is where regulatory compliance is a defense to tort liability: risk-
takers will strive to meet the regulatory rule and disregard the 
possibility of ex post liability. This represents the ideal condition 
according to Cane—where the regulatory standard is higher than or 
equal to the liability standard.216 
The important takeaway is that if the regulatory regime that is set 
to achieve the socially optimal level of care actually accomplishes its 
goal, then any additional precaution taken to meet a higher liability 
standard would generate inefficiency resulting in deadweight loss to 
the market. The flip side of this observation is that if the regulatory 
regime does not achieve the socially efficient level of care, then tort 
law may be an important complement to the regulation that ultimately 
serves to maximize social welfare.217 Steven Shavell recently 
developed a model to demonstrate the complimentary nature of 
regulation and negligence standards.218  This idealized outcome is 
shown in marginal form below in Figure 5, where the regulatory rule 
and liability standard operate as complements to yield the socially 
optimal level of precaution. 
  
	  
216 Cane, supra note 17, at 460–62. 
217 Logue, supra note 4, at 2332; Ruhl, supra note 64, at 781–82. 
218 Steven Shavell, A Fundamental Enforcement Cost Advantage of the Negligence 
Rule over Regulation 25 (Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 731, 2012) [hereinafter 
Shavell 2012] (“[I]f both instruments are utilized, then, on one hand, society will be 
effectively guaranteed that regulated precautions will be taken, which will be of value 
because in certain contexts the negligence rule will be ineffective in inducing 
precautions.”). 
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Figure 5. Redundant Regulation with Ideal Complements in Marginal 
Form 
 
Overlap between tort law and regulation raises a number of policy 
questions that implicate the legal doctrines of preemption, the 
compliance defense, and negligence per se. Theoretically, if 
regulations achieve optimal levels of risk and precaution, then under 
an efficiency criterion, perhaps compliance with the regulations 
should be a defense to litigation, and a violation of the regulations 
should be negligent as a matter of law. On the other hand, if the 
regulatory rule and liability standard both achieve less than the 
optimal level of precaution (probably a more accurate description of 
reality in most instances), then regulatory compliance should not be 
dispositive since compliance with both will be necessary to achieve 
an efficient outcome.219 In fact, there is good reason to believe that in 
many instances, tort law will act as a useful complement to other 
policy instruments. 
III 
TORT LAW VS. PUBLIC REGULATION 
Whether tort law or public regulation is a more efficient policy 
instrument has been the subject of contentious debate. One of the 	  
219 A regulatory infraction, though, should still count as negligent if the threat of a 
double sanction is required to induce efficient levels of compliance or if the provision of 
private and public remedies is made mutually exclusive by law. 
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central theses of this Article, though, is that neither litigation nor 
regulation is “more efficient” per se—there is no first-best policy 
instrument.220 Rather, each is suited to be more (or less) efficient 
under different conditions. The wisdom of Thomas Sowell’s famous 
remark, “[t]here are no solutions; there are only trade-offs,”221 comes 
to mind. Transaction costs of various types, bounded rationality, 
opportunism, and uncertainty mean that all policy instruments are 
imperfect, which is why—by accident or design—there are often 
overlapping systems of redundancy built into governance regimes. 
While I have thus far primarily highlighted many of tort law’s 
shortcomings, regulatory regimes are also imperfect in design, 
implementation, and enforcement. Alone, tort law is certainly not a 
panacea for most pollution externalities, but the limitations of 
litigation do not validate the alternative. Litigation cannot be 
evaluated in a vacuum, but rather must be assessed relative to 
regulation in a second-best world. Though litigation is clearly most 
effective when addressing relatively less frequent paradigm cases, it 
has many attributes that make it worthy of consideration as a 
complementary policy tool to ameliorate more complex threats to 
public health as well. 
In this section, I incorporate findings from the fields of law, 
economics, public policy, and political science on the strengths and 
limitations of litigation and regulation into a critical assessment of the 
arguments in favor of and against each as a policy tool. An 
interdisciplinary critical accounting of the arguments on each side of 
this debate will facilitate a synthesis of the literature that will better 
highlight the contexts in which tort law may serve as a useful 
complement to public regulation. This analysis will ultimately allow 
the debate to move forward. 
To that end, I appropriate evaluative criteria from the economics 
and public policy fields to assess litigation and regulation in a 
qualitative comparative institutional analysis. The criteria most often 
described in the institutional analysis literature are variations on 
equity, legitimacy, efficiency, and effectiveness.222 Environmental 	  
220 For example, Yandle attempts to comment on “which is best.” Bruce Yandle, The 
Common Law and the Environment in the Courts: Discussion of Code Law and Common 
Law, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647, 647–48 (2008). 
221 THOMAS SOWELL, THE VISION OF THE ANOINTED 142 (1995). 
222 Giandomenico Majone, Choice Among Policy Instruments for Pollution Control, 2 
POL’Y ANALYSIS 589, 600 (1976); Peter Bohm & Clifford S. Russell, Comparative 
Analysis of Alternative Policy Instruments, in 1 HANDBOOK OF NATURAL RESOURCE AND 
ENERGY ECONOMICS 395, 399–402 (Allen V. Kneese & James L. Sweeney eds., 1985); 
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policy researchers have, in certain instances, also adopted these 
criteria.223 Additionally, the criteria have made their way into the law 
and economics literature on litigation versus regulation,224 but most 
of that literature references the criteria incidentally or incompletely. 
Shavell designed the staple framework comparing tort standards 
and regulatory rules.225 He argues that information asymmetries and 
administrative costs weigh in favor of litigation while capital 
constraints on the ability of polluters to pay damages and the 
likelihood that culpable parties may not face lawsuits weighs in favor 
of regulation.226 All of Shavell’s analysis falls under effectiveness 
and efficiency criteria.227 Likewise, in a recent book by the National 	  
Barry C. Field & Martha K. Field, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTION 
182–93 (5th ed. 2009); Stuart S. Nagel, Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Equity in Public 
Policy Evaluation, 6 POL’Y STUD. REV. 99 (1986); Christine H. Rossell, Using Multiple 
Criteria to Evaluate Public Policies: The Case of School Desegregation, 21 AM. POL. Q. 
155, 159–67 (1993). Other criteria include Harold Lasswell’s “value terms,” John Rawls’s 
“maximin” principle, and Amartya Sen’s “capability approach.” Daniel H. Cole, The 
Varieties of Comparative Institutional Analysis, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 383, 396–97 (2013). 
223 Regina Birner et al., Who Should Be in Charge of Conservation? A Framework for 
Biodiversity Governance and a Case Study from Guatemala 3, 5–10 (Int’l Food Pol’y 
Research Inst., Working Paper No. 15, 2011); W. Neil Adger et al., Successful Adaptation 
to Climate Change Across Scales, 15 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 77, 80–83 (2005). Many 
of the studies on environmental policy instrument choice employ more specific criteria, 
which are more meaningful when comparing different types of regulatory instruments 
(e.g., flexibility and the capacity to encourage innovation). See OFFICE OF TECH. 
ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TOOLS: A USER’S GUIDE 143–
200 (1995); DEP’T FOR CMTYS & LOCAL GOV., MULTI-CRITERIA ANALYSIS: A MANUAL 
(2009), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment 
_data/file/7612/1132618.pdf; Don Fullerton, A Framework to Compare Environmental 
Policies, 68 S. ECON. J. 224, 237–45 (2001); Evgeny Guglyuvatyy, Climate Change Policy 
Evaluation: Method and Criteria, 40 ENVTL. POL’Y & L. 355, 357-61 (2010); Per 
Mickwitz, A Framework for Evaluating Environmental Policy Instruments, 9 
EVALUATION 415, 425–29 (2003). 
224 See generally MORRISS ET AL., supra note 8, at 105–06; Kaswan, supra note 68; 
Sangi, supra note 11, at 519–23. 
225 Shavell 1984, supra note 4; see also Brennan, supra note 88, at 56–57 (“Steven 
Shavell likely has done the best conceptual analysis.”). 
226 Shavell 1984, supra note 4; see also Adelman & Duncan, supra note 5, at 26–27 
(reviewing Shavell’s framework); Boyer & Porrini, supra note 1, at 259-61. 
227 Shavell and Louis Kaplow argue that including fairness as a criterion in policy 
decisions reduces social welfare for all. See generally LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN 
SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERUS WELFARE (2002); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness 
Versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Principle, Preferences, and Distributive Justice, 32 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 331 (2003). However, their definition of welfare is inclusive of distributive 
concerns. Id. at 351–55. For critiques, see Richard Craswell, Kaplow and Shavell on the 
Substance of Fairness, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 245 (2003); Michael B. Dorff, Why Welfare 
Depends on Fairness: A Reply to Kaplow and Shavell, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 847 (2002); 
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Preference, Well-Being, and Morality in Social Decisions, 32 J. 
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Bureau of Economic Research, Posner develops an analytical 
framework to compare the two institutions228 based on four 
dimensions: ex ante vs. ex post means of control, rules vs. standards, 
expert agencies vs. generalist courts, and public vs. private means of 
enforcement.229 Posner’s framework is very useful, but he seems to 
rely mostly on an efficiency criterion and only incidentally references 
other criteria. 
In a recent article, Mark Latham, Victor Schwartz, and Christopher 
Appel develop what they call a “comprehensive, neutral framework 
for analyzing how the tort system can and should respond to 
environmental injuries.”230 They argue that tort action should be 
based on actual injuries to people or property rather than inchoate 
losses or harm to the environment; harm must be based on objectively 
wrongful conduct (e.g., statutory compliance should be a dispositive 
defense); and statutes should be clear on preemption questions.231 
Several of the authors’ recommendations seem to rest on a fear that 
tort actions for harm to ecosystems or failure to conserve resources 
are on the horizon. That fear seems unfounded. Acknowledging the 
usefulness of tort law as a regulatory tool does not open the 
floodgates for torts without injury to persons or property. Moreover, 
their set of recommendations does not constitute a framework and, 
like many other evaluations before it, fails to take a multidisciplinary 
approach that assesses tort law relative to public regulation.232 
Ultimately, the authors’ analysis is recent evidence of the need for a 
common set of evaluative criteria in assessing the regulatory efficacy 
of litigation. 
This Article constitutes an attempt to recast the frame of the debate 
by deliberately encouraging the interdisciplinary usage of the 
economic and public policy evaluative criteria in the regulation versus 
	  
LEGAL STUD. 303 (2003); and Jeremy Waldron, Locating Distribution, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 
277 (2003). 
228 Referring to regulation and litigation as institutions, I employ Douglass North’s 
definition of institutions as the “rules of the game.” See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, 
INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3–4 (1990). 
229 Richard A. Posner, Regulation (Agencies) Versus Litigation (Courts): An Analytical 
Framework, in REGULATION VERSUS LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS AND 
LAW 11 (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2011). 
230 Latham et al., supra note 114, at 739. 
231 Id. at 764–72. 
232 The comparative analysis that the authors do include is entirely in the context of 
carbon dioxide regulation. 
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litigation debate.233 Developing common evaluative criteria makes it 
more difficult for scholars to talk past one another. Moreover, 
establishing a common language facilitates the development of 
empirically testable hypotheses that emanate from the legal field 
because legal scholars will be using the same language as researchers 
from the public administration, public policy, and political science 
fields who regularly engage in empirical analysis. In the subsections 
that follow, I therefore compare litigation and regulation by 
employing four evaluation criteria, modified to address the questions 
that are relevant to this debate: 
A. Equity & Corrective Justice: Which system best provides 
victims with a reasonable remedy? 
B. Democratic Legitimacy: Which system adheres most closely to 
the tenets of constitutional democracy? 
C. Efficiency & Organizational Competence: Which system is 
most amenable to identifying socially optimal levels of 
abatement and pollution-generating activity? 
D. Effectiveness & Cost-Effectiveness: Which system is most 
likely to achieve its policy objectives and at what comparative 
cost? 
A. Equity & Corrective Justice 
The debate relies largely on economic conceptions of tort law as a 
system of regulation to deter risky activity. As an economic tool, tort 
law is only useful insofar as the looming threat of litigation 
encourages risk-takers to adopt cost-internalizing precautionary 
measures. The victim and the injury that she suffers at the hand of the 
tortfeasor are of secondary importance under this theory. Economic 
conceptions of tort law, therefore, tend to devalue victims.234 The 
public policy literature includes equity as an evaluative criterion to 
account for the distributional impacts of a policy. Indeed, critiquing 
efficiency as a policy-making criterion, Thomas McGarity writes, “[a] 
change is efficient if it results in an additional one million dollars in 	  
233 My analysis is influenced to a great extent by the ideals of Indiana University’s 
Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, which 
emphasizes interdisciplinary research and dialogue. For information regarding the Ostrom 
Workshop, visit http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/. 
234 See Cane, supra note 17, at 433; Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective 
Justice in Tort Law of Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 195 (2000); Logue, supra note 4, 
at 2333–34; Schroeder, supra note 44, at 587–88. 
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the pocket of Bill Gates and it takes $9,999 from 100 people with 
yearly incomes of $20,000.”235 In many instances, especially those in 
which the winners are blameworthy in bringing about adverse 
distributional changes, the losers should be provided compensation. 
Therefore, a primary justification for tort law, as described above, 
is that it serves as a corrective justice mechanism.236 Though there is 
no settled definition of what “corrective justice” means, Jules 
Coleman describes four elements: 
First, [corrective justice] applies to human agency, not, say, to 
natural misfortunes. Second, it is concerned with repair or 
rectification. Third, it is concerned with rectifying some kind of 
wrongdoing . . . . Fourth, it involves correlativity: “The claims of 
corrective justice are limited or restricted to parties who bear some 
normatively important relationship to one another. A person does 
not . . . have a claim in corrective justice to repair in the air, against 
no one in particular.”237 
Which theory—deterrence or justice—is a “better” conception of 
tort law is another decades-long scholarly debate that will never be 
resolved. In the environmental context, though, one of the great 
strengths of tort law over public regulation is that liability serves both 
functions. Compensation regimes (insurance, for example) and public 
regulations are somewhat insular: the former address the injury, and 
the latter address the causation. Tort law, though, is “bilateral” in that 
it both compensates victims and sends a deterrence signal.238 The vast 
majority of the United States’ environmental regulatory statutes, 
though, provide no compensation mechanism for pollution victims 
even if the culpable party violated the regulatory mandates: penalties 
go to the government, not to victims.239 	  
235 McGarity 2005, supra note 170, at 391. 
236 COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 14, at 269–70; JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND 
WRONGS 303–28 (1992); Keating, supra note 234, at 195; Meiners & Yandle, supra note 
23, at 960; Popper, supra note 22, at 181–83; Schwartz 1997, supra note 44, at 1801; see 
also ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 24 (1999); ERNEST J. 
WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 56–83 (1995); George P. Fletcher, Fairness and 
Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 547 (1972); Shapo, supra note 86, at 544. 
237 Keating, supra note 234, at 197 (quoting Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of 
Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 53, 67 (David G. 
Owen ed., 1995)). Justice is a difficult-to-define concept that means many things to many 
people. For a discussion of meanings of justice in the context of law and economics, see 
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1102–05. 
238 Cane, supra note 17, at 429; Schwartz 1997, supra note 44. 
239 Kaswan, supra note 68, at 102–03; Klass 2007, supra note 157, at 583; McGarity 
2005, supra note 170, at 391–92; Sangi, supra note 11, at 521. In several limited settings, 
though, Congress has limited liability and developed regulatory compensation 
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That the tort system seeks to provide defendants with 
compensation equal to the damages suffered is a source of 
inefficiency, though. An emissions tax, for example, “provide[s] an 
incentive to reduce emissions by attaching a price to pollution on the 
margin. Because every polluter faces the same marginal tax rate, they 
independently choose abatement levels at which their marginal 
abatement costs are equal, satisfying a necessary condition for cost-
effectiveness.”240 A tort remedy would be neither priced on the 
margin nor applicable to all polluters. Yet, even if liability sends a 
sub-optimal deterrence signal, tort law, imperfect as it is, provides 
compensation to victims without seriously undermining our society’s 
moral notions of “agency, responsibility and reparation.”241 
Some critics of liability as a policy instrument suggest the 
establishment of an alternative regulatory mechanism to compensate 
victims of pollution. The primary alternatives suggested in the 
literature are variations of insurance schemes.242  The benefit of a 
social insurance program to compensate victims of pollution is that 
injured parties may theoretically collect on benefits regardless of 
fault.243  However, establishing a private insurance system to replace 
tort law as a compensatory mechanism for pollution victims would 
constitute an unnerving reduction in protection for America’s most 
vulnerable communities. Moving to a private insurance system 
removes the courts as a non-biased institution in the compensation 
process in favor of an entity (the insurance company) that has a 
financial incentive to contest and deny coverage—an undeniable 
problem in the United States’ present health insurance system.244 In 	  
mechanisms. Klass 2009, supra note 44, at 1568–69 (discussing the Price-Anderson Act, 
the National Childhood Vaccine Act, and the Black Lung Benefits Act). 
240 Nathaniel O. Keohane, Comment, Evaluating Instruments of Environmental Policy: 
A Comment on Professor Richards, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 389, 395 (2000). 
241 Keating, supra note 234, at 195. 
242 See Logue, supra note 4, at 2319–20; Menell, supra note 44, at 103. In his criticism 
of tort law as an environmental policy instrument, Menell suggests “expanding the use of 
the private insurance system (perhaps through direct subsidies or vouchers), enhancing the 
social welfare compensatory systems, [or] developing new administrative systems.” Id. 
Additionally, civil penalties do not achieve corrective justice because the money damages 
are not paid to the plaintiff. See Johnson, supra note 66, at 598–99. 
243 Viscusi, supra note 17, at 70. 
244 See, e.g., SCOT J. PALTROW, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, INSURERS’ BLACK BOX: 
NOW-SECRET CLAIMS DENIAL RATES COULD TELL CONSUMERS A LOT ABOUT THEIR 
INSURANCE COMPANY (2009), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content 
/uploads/issues/2009/10/pdf/insurers_black_box.pdf; Mark J. Browne, Evidence of 
Adverse Selection in the Individual Health Insurance Market, 59 J. RISK & INS. 13, 27 
(1992); Ann Marie Marciarille & J. Bradford DeLong, Bending the Health Cost Curve: 
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addition, environmental risks do not satisfy the conditions of 
insurability. 
Kolstad concludes that while environmental risks lend themselves 
to risk pooling and correcting for moral hazard problems, there are 
three disadvantages to environmental insurance systems.245 First, it 
will be difficult for victims to identify a clear harm and establish 
causation against the background rates of their diseases.246 This is 
especially problematic given that the victims will be presenting their 
cases not to juries but to insurance companies, which have a financial 
incentive to find against causation.247 Second, losses will not occur in 
a well-defined period of time given the long latency of environmental 
damages.248 As Kolstad explains, “eventually everything 
happens.”249 If the risk that an insurance company will have to pay 
for losses approaches 100 percent over a long enough timeframe, then 
it becomes uneconomical for the company to offer the insurance 
coverage in the first place. Third, insurance companies will be unable 
to calculate efficient premiums because the frequency and magnitude 
of environmental contamination is uncertain.250 “If the premium is 
too large, no insurance will be sold; if it is too small, insurers will lose 
money or possibly become bankrupt.”251 
An insurance system might also bear an adverse selection problem, 
depriving victims of compensation from uninsured polluters.252  An 
insurance company should be able to identify polluters within a close 
proximity to vulnerable communities and charge those polluters 
higher premiums under the rationale that a close proximity between 
the source of pollution and potential victims increases the risk of 
harm. In other words, insurance premiums are likely to be the highest 
in those areas where the risk of harm from environmental 
contamination is the highest. Unless insurance coverage is mandatory 
for potential polluters, then there is a risk that polluters in high-
premium areas may forego insurance altogether, leaving the most 	  
The Promise and Peril of the Independent Payment Advisory Board, 22 HEALTH MATRIX 
75, 86–87 (2012) (suggesting that adverse selection exists in individual health insurance 
markets). 




249 Id. at 390. 
250 Id. at 388–92. 
251 Id. at 390. 
252 Id. at 391–92. 
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vulnerable communities unprotected. Moreover, the populations most 
likely to be affected by environmental contamination are poor 
minority communities.253 At least under a tort system, victims of 
pollution have a fighting chance of holding the offending polluters 
accountable by seeking civil remedies.254 An insurance system, on the 
other hand, may take the most powerful remedy for environmental 
contamination away from people who are simultaneously the most 
vulnerable to pollution and the least protected. Replacing tort law 
with a private insurance scheme could amount to an environmental 
justice catastrophe. 
B. Democratic Legitimacy 
The second evaluation factor to consider is legitimacy—which 
system of regulation adheres most closely to the tenets of 
constitutional democracy. The other elements that I have included in 
this framework—provision of a remedy, efficiency, and 
effectiveness—all relate to the fulfillment of an objective of any 
environmental regulatory program, and they therefore reflect the dual 
goals of tort law in general: optimal deterrence and corrective justice. 
The preservation of democratic principles, then, is somewhat unique 
because legitimacy is not a purpose but a constraining factor to any 
regulation. “Democratic principles present a key parameter by which 
to evaluate the choice between the common law and public law.”255 
Indeed, that constitutional democratic principles serve as the 
foundation of our governance structure is not something to be taken 
lightly. Public participation in the policy-making process is a 
cornerstone of the United States’ governance structure.256 I therefore 
posit that questions of access to and the accountability of the policy-
making process are central factors to consider when making a policy 
instrument choice. 
When considering legitimacy, scholars tend to prefer public 
regulation because the public has greater access to influence decisions 
of Congress and the bureaucracy.257 Legislators are elected through a 	  
253 See generally UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND 
COMMUNITIES OF COLOR (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994). 
254 Johnson, supra note 66, at 599. 
255 Kaswan, supra note 68, at 98. 
256 See Roy Peled & Yoram Rabin, The Constitutional Right to Information, 42 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 357, 357–70 (2011) (describing rationales for the public’s 
right to information). 
257 Sangi, supra note 11, at 518. 
ABELKOP (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/14  4:45 PM 
432 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92, 2 
democratic process, which serves as an accountability mechanism.258 
Citizens also have a degree of access to communicate with and 
express their preferences to their legislators. Public participation in 
the policy-making process improves the quality and reception of 
environmental laws.259 Congressional representatives actively gather 
information on citizen preferences through polling data, direct 
communication, and even through interest groups. Empirical political 
science research finds that the elected branches of government—
especially the House of Representatives—respond to changes in 
citizen preferences relatively quickly.260 Elected officials act in a way 
to represent constituents’ preferences because otherwise they are 
likely to be (or at least fear that they will be) replaced.261 
The public also has access to the regulatory rulemaking process 
through notice and comment procedures.262 However, citizen 
preferences are not likely to be very influential in the rulemaking 
setting. The regulatory state is highly complex and notoriously 
difficult for ordinary citizens to navigate.263  Although citizens and 
public interests groups do provide comments on prospective rules and 
rule changes, any given citizen comment is unlikely to influence the 
final rule in a meaningful way. 
Additionally, empirical analysis indicates business interests 
dominate rulemaking in terms of both participation and influence.264 	  
258 See Kaswan, supra note 68, at 99; Sangi, supra note 11, at 518. 
259 LAZARUS, supra note 95, at 189–90. 
260 See generally James Stimson et al., Dynamic Representation, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
543, 558–59 (1995). 
261 Stephen Ansolabehere & Philip Edward Jones, Constituents’ Responses to 
Congressional Roll-Call Voting, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 583, 596 (2010) (finding that roll-call 
voting affects citizen perspectives on their representatives). 
262 Kaswan, supra note 68, at 99; Sangi, supra note 11, at 518. 
263 Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort 
Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693, 702–05 (2007) (discussing the high process costs associated 
with public participation in regulatory policymaking); KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 
40, at 114–16. 
264 Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing 
Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128, 135 (2006) (“Our 
results . . . suggest that the APA’s legal framework for promoting public participation in 
rulemaking does not succeed in equalizing the influence of all types of participants. In 
other words, just because the notice and comment period may appear ‘refreshingly 
democratic’ in its call for public participation during agency decision making, this does 
not mean that the interests of the broader public are furthered in agency rulemaking.” 
(citation omitted)); see also KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 40, at 194, 199; Wendy E. 
Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 
1321, 1385–86 (2010) [hereinafter Wagner 2010]. 
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During the comment period, agencies routinely receive thousands of 
comments, often receiving more for higher profile rules. For example, 
EPA’s proposed rule to restrict carbon dioxide pollution from new 
power plants drew 2.5 million comments.265 Most citizen comments 
are not supported with the type of specialized research or warranted 
arguments that characterize many business or interest group 
comments, and therefore agencies are freer to discount these citizen 
comments without the risk of acting in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner. That is especially true when rules address highly technical 
issues. Ordinary citizens and even public interest groups are often 
unable to amass the resources and technical expertise to match 
business interests in influencing rules through formal comments and 
other contacts with bureaucrats.266 Finally, bureaucrats are more 
removed from the public eye than are legislators. They are not 
elected, but appointed or hired; therefore, citizens have little means to 
hold bureaucrats directly accountable for their actions. 
The risk of regulatory capture or other undue influence by interest 
groups and regulated industries—recognized as a threat to democracy 
by James Madison in Federalist No. 10267—presents an additional 
weakness of both legislative and rulemaking processes.268  Interest 
groups are goal-oriented organizations that seek to influence policy to 
advance the objectives of the companies or individuals they represent. 
Regulatory capture occurs when regulated parties come to exert a 
great deal of control over the decisions of the regulatory authority.269 
Even if firms do not “capture” the agency that regulates them, 
legislative and regulatory processes are susceptible to the influence of 
industry at multiple stages in the policy-making process in almost all 
areas of public health and safety regulation.270 	  
265 Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units (proposed April 13, 2012), available at 
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-09/documents/20130920proposal.pdf. 
266 See generally Wagner 2010, supra note 264. 
267 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
268 See generally FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: 
WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND WHY (2009). 
269 Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 
203, 203 (2006); Joel A. Mintz, Has Industry Captured the EPA?: Appraising Marver 
Bernstein’s Captive Agency Theory After Fifty Years, 17 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 1 
(2005); Craig W. Thomas et al., Special Interest Capture of Regulatory Agencies: A Ten-
Year Analysis of Voting Behavior on Regional Fishery Management Councils, 38 POL’Y 
STUD. J. 447 (2010). 
270 Mintz, supra note 269, at 19; Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible 
Regulation and Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 464 (1999). 
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Public choice theory explains that self-interested politicians and 
bureaucrats tend to collaborate with regulated industries as a result of 
asymmetries in the policy-making process.271 Regulated industries 
form organized, motivated, well funded, highly informed, and vocal 
groups to represent their interests to legislators, congressional staffers, 
and bureaucrats. The public, on the other hand, tends to be less 
organized, less motivated, less informed, less vocal, and not as well 
funded.272 This is especially true when it comes to low salience, 
highly technocratic issues common in environmental and public 
health regulation.273 Dan Esty expounds: 
[T]he complexity and opacity of many environmental issues and the 
public’s difficulty in perceiving its own interest make the risk of 
special interest manipulation much more severe in the 
environmental realm than in other fields of regulation or 
government activity. Simply put, the average citizen knows if he or 
she is getting adequate roads or schools and even has a sense of 
whether the government regulation of banks seems appropriate. In 
many environmental circumstances, however, no comparable basis 
for judging the adequacy of outcomes exists . . . . In this non-
transparent world, the threats of special interest manipulation and 
public choice failures are very real and often very large.274  
Regulations are susceptible to this undue influence at every stage 
of the policy-making process. At the legislative stage, industry may 
influence legislators and staffers through lobbying efforts, campaign 
contributions, issue advertising, testimony, and the provision of 
information.275 Following Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission,276 which affirmed the First Amendment right of 
corporations to financially support political candidates, campaign 
finance may become a particularly notable method by which 
industries exert their influence over the democratic process.277 	  
271 WOLF, supra note 14, at 5, 36; Wagner, supra note 263, at 697–708. 
272 WOLF, supra note 14, at 41–43; Hylton, supra note 57, at 523–24; Meiners & 
Yandle, supra note 23, at 954–56; Mintz, supra note 269, at 10–11, 18–19. 
273 See Diana Evans, Before the Roll Call: Interest Group Lobbying and Public Policy 
Outcomes in House Committees, 49 POL. RESEARCH Q. 287, 300–01 (1996). 
274 Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1495, 1548–49 (1999); see also Mintz, supra note 269, at 19–20. 
275 BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 268, at 153; Morten Bennedsen & Sven E. 
Feldmann, Lobbying Legislatures, 110 J. POL. ECON. 919, 920–21 (2002); Hylton, supra 
note 57, at 523–24. 
276 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
277 See David D. Kirkpatrick, Lobbyists Get Potent Weapon in Campaign Ruling, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/politics/22donate.html? 
_r=0; LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 
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Empirically, interest groups have been most successful at blocking 
regulation and defending the status quo.278 
Even when Congress does enact legislation, lobbying efforts have 
been successful at limiting legislative burdens.279 For instance, 
Congress called on relatively few scientists to testify at the hearings 
prior to the passage of the CAA and CWA. Instead, the vast majority 
of witnesses at those hearings represented industry interest groups.280 
The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA),281 to take another 
example, includes a poison pill within its legislative text that limit its 
effectiveness to the advantage of industry. Specifically, under section 
6, EPA may pass rules to limit the risk posed by an industrial 
chemical only “to the extent necessary to protect adequately against 
such risk using the least burdensome requirements.”282 The Fifth 
Circuit in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. Environmental Protection 
Agency overturned EPA’s ban on asbestos after finding that EPA did 
not impose the “least burdensome” requirements on the manufacture 
and use of asbestos products.283 The statutory language of TSCA 
section 6, therefore, is one of the primary reasons why EPA has 
regulated so few industrial chemicals under TSCA.284 
Yet, even sound statutory language would not save a regulatory 
program from the influence of interest groups. Companies may sway 
bureaucrats’ decision making through a variety of methods including 
outright bribery, implicit and explicit threats to a regulators’ 
reputation, the promise of future employment (often referred to as the 
“revolving door” phenomenon), and the provision of highly technical 	  
NEW GILDED AGE 252-82 (2008); MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: 
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 234-52 (2012). 
278 BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 268, at 29–45, 215–38; Susan Webb Yackee, 
Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: The Influence of Interest Group Comments on Federal 
Agency Rulemaking, 16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RESEARCH & THEORY 103, 111, 116–17 (2005). 
279 Meiners & Yandle, supra note 23, at 956–58. 
280 Id. at 957 (“[I]t does not appear that Congress was much interested in gathering 
scientific evidence to guide them in policy making.”). 
281 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–92 (2006). 
282 § 2605(a) (emphasis added). 
283 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
284 Ortwin Renn & E. Donald Elliott, Chemicals, in THE REALITY OF PRECAUTION: 
COMPARING RISK REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 223, 234–35 
(Jonathan B. Wiener et al. eds., 2011); John S. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and 
REACH: Practical Principles for Chemical Regulation Reform, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721, 
737 (2008); David Markell, An Overview of TSCA, its History and Key Underlying 
Assumptions, and its Place in Environmental Regulation, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 333, 
367 (2010). 
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information.285 Indeed, agencies have limited resources for data 
collection and must therefore rely on the cooperation of regulated 
entities to report accurate and timely data, affording those firms the 
opportunity to undercut regulations by providing inaccurate or 
incomplete information.286 Conversely, Wendy Wagner has shown 
that industry has become adept at overloading agency staff with too 
much information—a phenomenon that she refers to as “information 
capture.”287 She illustrates: “[a] continuous barrage of letters, 
telephone calls, meetings, follow-up memoranda, formal comments, 
post-rule comments, petitions for reconsideration, and notices of 
appeal from knowledgeable interest groups over the life cycle of a 
rulemaking can have a ‘machine-gun’ effect on overstretched agency 
staff.”288 By law, agencies are not permitted to disregard any of this 
material.289 Through all of these methods, even in the absence of 
explicit malfeasance, business interests have been able to influence 
regulatory standard setting to their advantage through street-level 
contacts with agency staff.290 
The stage of the policy-making process that is most vulnerable to 
undue influence, though, is enforcement, where individual 
bureaucrats must make decisions regarding monitoring, whether to 
initiate an enforcement action, and the type of enforcement action to 
be used.291 By its nature, enforcement lacks the transparency and 
mechanisms for public involvement that characterize lawmaking and 
	  
285 THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 359 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980); Dal Bó, supra 
note 269, at 212–14; Hylton, supra note 57, 520–21; McGarity 2002, supra note 118, at 
560–68; Yackee & Yackee, supra note 266, at 105. 
286 McGarity 2002, supra note 118, at 549, 559–68; see generally THOMAS O. 
MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: HOW SPECIAL INTERESTS 
CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH (2008). 
287 Wagner 2010, supra note 264, at 1325 (“In the regulatory context, information 
capture refers to the excessive use of information and related information costs as a means 
of gaining control over regulatory decisionmaking in informal rulemakings.”). 
288 Id. 
289 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006); see also Adams v. U.S. 
Evntl. Prot. Agency, 38 F.3d 43, 51–53 (1st Cir. 1994); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); United States v. Nova Scotia 
Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252-53 (2d Cir. 1977); Wagner 2010, supra note 264, at 
1354–55. 
290 McGarity 2005, supra note 170, at 381; Wagner 2010, supra note 264, at 1346, 
1367–69 (analyzing pre-Notice of Proposed Rulemaking discussions). 
291 Mintz, supra note 269, at 3–4, 20–21; Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental 
Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 
81 (2002). 
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rulemaking.292 Enforcement is largely insulated from scrutiny by 
legislators and the judiciary and involves close interaction between 
regulators and industry.293 Indeed, bureaucrats and the firms they 
regulate often interact on a daily basis and therefore form professional 
relationships with one another. The implication is that regulators may 
feel pressure to avoid strict enforcement of regulations lest they 
disrupt the cooperative professional relationships with the businesses 
they interact with each day (and for whom they may rely on for future 
employment).294 Finally, a conflict of interest arises when 
manipulation does occur: no agency wants to admit publicly that it 
has been compromised.295  
Though theory and case study examples abound, empirical 
evidence on the incidence of regulatory capture is scarce.296 Joel 
Mintz, however, has examined the full length of EPA’s history for 
evidence of capture.297  He concludes that although EPA has managed 
to avoid complete capture, trends indicate that “EPA is not immune 
from regulatory capture,” and its enforcement efforts in particular 
have come awfully close to captivity at several points during the 
administrations of Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and 
George W. Bush.298 
Pluralists may counter that many progressive groups exist to 
advance the public interest in matters concerning the environment and 
public safety. However, regulated industries have far greater 
resources available to influence the policy-making processes of EPA 
and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration than do 
public interest groups.299 At the very least, advocates of public 
regulation over liability entitlements must account for the costs 
associated with guarding against regulatory capture300 and should not 
be so quick to tout the democratic advantage of public regulation over 
tort law. 
	  
292 Mintz, supra note 269, at 3–4, 20–21; Zinn, supra note 291. 
293 Mintz, supra note 269, at 3–4, 20–21; Zinn, supra note 291. 
294 McGarity 2002, supra note 118, at 656–66. 
295 Id. at 578. 
296 Dal Bó, supra note 269, at 220. 
297 Mintz, supra note 269. 
298 Id. at 26–28. 
299 McGarity 2005, supra note 170, at 381. 
300 Boyer & Porrini, supra note 1, at 257. 
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Indeed, political and legal scholars often suggest that the judicial 
branch is “the least democratic branch.”301 First, many judges are not 
elected, and citizens are therefore not able to hold them accountable 
for the public policy effects of their decisions. Second, tort suits 
account only for the interests of the private parties, interveners, and 
amici participants,302 whereas environmental policy must take into 
account a multitude of constituencies separated by time (i.e., multiple 
generations) and space.303 
The judicial system, however, is less accountable by design: the 
courts are supposed to be removed from the political process to act as 
a counter-majoritarian institution.304 And, although judges are not 
meant to make policy—often referred to as “judicial activism” or 
“legislation from the bench”305—liability entitlement is not an 
undemocratic policy instrument. After all, “[t]ort law still applies 
community or collective norms, often under a rubric of 
‘unreasonableness.’ Those norms, though, are spelled out through an 
iterative process of individualized litigation, not through an 
intentional decision of some public entity.”306 
In A Common Law for the Age of Statutes, Calabresi argued that 
this iterative process affords judges the opportunity to incrementally 
change the law by applying it to evolving fact patterns.307 
Specifically, Calabresi called on judges to repeal outdated statutes. 
Judges and legislators, though, do not need to be so bold to 
acknowledge the usefulness of tort law as a policy instrument. In fact, 
Justice Cardozo constantly advocated for judges to incorporate 
progressive social values and morals into their jurisprudence.308 The 	  
301 See, e.g., JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS 
SERVE AMERICA, at xiii (2006). 
302 Kaswan, supra note 68, at 99; Sangi, supra note 10, at 519–20; Schroeder, supra 
note 44, at 586. 
303 Schroeder, supra note 44, at 586. 
304 Kaswan, supra note 68, at 99; McGarity 2005, supra note 170, at 382; Sangi, supra 
note 11, at 520. 
305 See, e.g., Bruce G. Peabody, Legislating from the Bench: A Definition and a 
Defense, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185 (2007). 
306 Schroeder, supra note 44, at 585; see also Hylton, supra note 57, at 525 (“What 
emerges from negligence litigation is a set of conduct norms that are shaped by the private 
information of parties. Although courts decide only the individual cases in front of them, 
the decisions create precedents that shape specific conduct norms that apply to future 
cases.”); Sangi, supra note 11, at 520. 
307 GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); see also 
Klass 2007, supra note 157, at 555–56. 
308 Klass 2007, supra note 157, at 552–53. 
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common law should not ignore advances in social norms, economics, 
and science.309 The process in common law “is continuous; it draws 
together information on controversies as they occur; and evolves as 
the world changes.”310 
Moreover, what I call for in this Article is for legislators to give 
greater consideration to tort law as a policy instrument that can be 
incorporated into environmental and public health legislation. The 
very decision to rely on tort standards, therefore, should be a 
collective decision.311 The incorporation of privately enforced 
liability entitlements into future environmental statutes may also be a 
method to reduce the risk of undue interest group influence. To be 
sure, courts are also susceptible to political and business interests.312 
Judges harbor political ideologies, many state judges are elected, and 
business interests have more money than citizens or public interest 
groups to hire better attorneys, pay for more hours of work, appeal 
cases, and engage in strategic settlements.313 Still, the judiciary’s 
relative insulation from the political process provides some measure 
of protection from lobbying efforts and undue influence from industry 
and interest groups.314 
The courts also improve citizens’ access to the policy-making 
process. An army of plaintiffs’ attorneys is perpetually available to 
advocate on behalf of victims in exchange for contingency fees.315 
The tort system addresses information asymmetries by lowering entry 
barriers and information costs for ordinary citizens who fall victim to 
	  
309 Butler, supra note 14, at 705–06 (“Command-and-control bureaucrats and 
legislators are often oblivious to changes inherent in a dynamic world, but common law 
environmentalism and jurisdictional competition provide a dynamic process through which 
policy options are discovered and discarded in response to the reality of perpetual changes 
in technology and political preferences.”); Kaswan, supra note 68, at 100; Klass 2007, 
supra note 157, at 551–56, 592–95; Sangi, supra note 11, at 519. 
310 Meiners & Yandle, supra note 23, at 959. 
311 FARHANG, supra note 6, at 3–4; Schroeder, supra note 44, at 555–56. 
312 Andrei Shleifer, Efficient Regulation, in REGULATION VERSUS LITIGATION, supra 
note 229, at 32–37. 
313 See generally Cross, supra note 187, at 971–75; Frank B. Cross, Political Science 
and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. 
U. L. REV. 251 (1997); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the 
D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997); Paul H. Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 
11 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1982). 
314 Butler, supra note 14, at 721–22; Kaswan, supra note 68, at 99; McGarity 2005, 
supra note 170, at 373, 381–82; Posner, supra note 229, at 19–20; Yandle, supra note 220, 
at 656–58. 
315 Wagner, supra note 263, at 703–04. 
ABELKOP (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/14  4:45 PM 
440 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92, 2 
pollution externalities.316 Finally, appellate courts and the legislature 
serve as a constant democratic check on judicial overreach.317 
Therefore, the implication is that the interests of democracy do not 
weigh completely in favor of public regulation over liability 
entitlements. 
C. Efficiency & Organizational Competence 
As important as legitimacy and compensation are from ethical, 
distributional, and political perspectives, if the goal is to achieve the 
optimal level of protection, then tort law’s utility as a policy 
instrument depends on the ability of the judicial system to provide 
meaningful input into standard-setting processes.318 I therefore turn to 
the question of which system—judicial or regulatory—is most 
amenable to identifying socially optimal levels of abatement and 
pollution (or precaution and risk). I label this an “efficiency” 
criterion. Even though effectiveness is also a key component of 
economic efficiency, I consider effectiveness separately. 
Efficiency is about the relation of input and output; however, much 
of the literature comparing tort law and public regulation muddles the 
questions of setting the socially optimal standard and achieving the 
goals of that standard. For the purposes of comparative institutional 
analysis in this context, therefore, I find it conceptually useful to 
address these questions separately. To answer the efficiency question, 
we must address the ways in which our governance organizations and 
institutions develop standards and rules, how they gather data, and 
how they incorporate that information and expertise into those 
standards and rules—what I call “organizational competence.” 
Liability entitlements generally operate through broad standards 
(e.g., reasonableness) whereas public environmental regulations 
usually function through extensive rules. The distinction between 
standards and rules, therefore, becomes important. A rule specifies 
permissible or impermissible conduct in advance, leaving the 
adjudicator to determine only the factual question of whether a 
person’s conduct violates the rule. Conversely, a standard requires the 
adjudicator to determine both what is permissible (i.e., the meaning of 
the standard) and the factual question of whether the conduct violates 	  
316 Id. at 697–709. 
317 Klass 2007, supra note 157, at 555–56. 
318 Cane, supra note 17, at 464; see also Butler, supra note 14, at 730–31 (illuminating 
differences between effectiveness and efficiency). 
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the standard.319 Under a rule, the law has content ex ante the conduct, 
and under a standard, the law is only given content ex post.320 Louis 
Kaplow illustrates this distinction with highway speed limits: a rule 
would prohibit driving faster than 55 miles per hour while a standard 
would prohibit driving at “an excessive speed.”321 This example 
highlights that Congress and agencies can adopt either standards or 
rules at their discretion, so the question of “standards or rules” is not 
necessarily a question of “courts or Congress.” Because I argue that 
Congress should adopt liability standards to be enforced by the courts 
more often than it currently does, I must address both of those 
questions. 
Two primary factors determine whether a rule or a standard is best 
suited to address a regulatory problem. The first factor is the 
frequency of the behavior to be regulated and how often adjudication 
will be necessary.322 Rules are more expensive to establish, yet 
standards are more expensive to apply.323 Therefore, if the behavior is 
common and it is likely that many enforcement actions will be 
necessary, then the cost of establishing a rule to “resolve[] the issue 
on a wholesale basis” will be less than the expense of having to 
repeatedly adjudicate a standard over and over.324 The second factor 
is whether firms will seek legal advice before they act.325  If so, then 
rules have an advantage over standards because rules specify 
precisely what is and is not permissible and are therefore easier and 
less costly for a firm to learn before it acts.326 
Indeed, the importance of advance notice, predictability, and 
consistency of the law is one of the primary criticisms of standards, 
especially as applied through the common law.327 Courts have echoed 
this argument as well, primarily in preemption cases. In TVA, for 	  
319 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 
559–60 (1992); Posner, supra note 229, at 16–17. 
320 See Posner, supra note 229, at 13–16 (comparing ex ante and ex post policies); see 
also Shavell 2012, supra note 218. 
321 Kaplow, supra note 319, at 560. 
322 Id. at 563–64, 579–80. 
323 Steven J. Eagle, The Common Law and the Environment, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
583, 618–19 (2008); Posner, supra note 229, at 18. 
324 Kaplow, supra note 319, at 563; see also Adelman & Duncan, supra note 5, at 26; 
Eagle, supra note 323, at 618–19. 
325 Kaplow, supra note 319, at 563–64. 
326 Id. 
327 See Cane, supra note 17, at 464–66; Kaswan, supra note 68, at 101–04; Klass 2007, 
supra note 157, at 582–83; McGarity 2005, supra note 170, at 380–81. 
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example, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that allowing a nuisance action 
to proceed against power plants operating with valid permits under 
the CAA would confound industry with incapacitating uncertainty as 
to the applicable standard it must meet to operate free of liability.328 
In addition to reasoning that nuisance standards are vague and applied 
retrospectively, the court also determined that they are inconsistently 
applied across jurisdictions.329  
In Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, the Third Circuit firmly 
rejected these arguments.330 First, the objective of the CAA is to 
place responsibility for emissions regulations on the states, with 
guidance from EPA in a cooperative federalism framework.331 In so 
doing, the CAA sets only a baseline of rules and invites states to enact 
stricter rules or standards, which may include tort laws.332 The CAA 
by its very nature therefore results in fragmented regulation across the 
country due to variations in state implementation plans. The court 
further stated that adding one additional standard (state tort law) that 
firms must adhere to would not go so far as to unduly burden 
industry.333 As the Third and Fourth Circuits are engaged in what 
seems to be a policy debate about the role of tort law in 
environmental regulation, it is vitally important for jurists to 
understand that tort law functions as a complement to other regulatory 
tools in many ways. 
Criticisms of the Fourth Circuit’s approach to tort law and 
preemption further highlight the advantages of flexible standards.334 
Whereas rules apply to specific, common patterns of behavior, 
liability standards have an intrinsically valuable capacity to address 
circumstances where activities cause harm that falls outside the reach 
of regulatory rules.335  Standards, therefore, are most appropriate to 
govern heterogeneous behavior. Negligence standards, for example, 	  
328 615 F.3d 291, 301–06 (4th Cir. 2010). However, given the barriers to litigation, it is 
unlikely that industry would be faced with a flood of nuisance lawsuits. Brief of Amici 
Curiae National Parks Conservation Association et al. in Support of the State of North 
Carolina at 21, North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth. (TVA), 615 F.3d 291 
(4th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-1623); Sangi, supra note 11, at 522. 
329 TVA, 615 F.3d at 300. 
330 No. 12-4216, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 17283, at *24–26 (3d Cir. Aug. 20, 2013). 
331 Id. at *3–4. 
332 Id. at *17; International Paper v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 497 (1987). 
333 Bell, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 17283, at *25–26; Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 498–99. 
334 See generally Sangi, supra note 11. 
335 Eagle, supra note 323, at 618–19; Kaplow, supra note 319, at 563–64; Kaswan, 
supra note 68, at 104. 
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resolve conflicts that arise from a vast range of distinct and 
improbable accidents.336 Because of the sheer breadth of unique 
circumstances, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to account for 
all of these scenarios through rules. The cost of generating a rule to 
cover every contingency would far exceed the cost of applying a 
general standard on a case-by-case basis.337 Common law “is 
dynamic and spontaneous, yet orderly.”338 Precedent resulting in 
inefficiencies can be weeded out through challenges or rejection in 
other jurisdictions.339 The inherent flexibility of standards also 
affords judges the ability to modernize the law so as to keep it in line 
with advances in science.340  Statutes, on the other hand, run the risk 
of remaining in force even after the economic or scientific 
foundations upon which they rest have been discredited.341  EPA’s 
recent failed attempt at enacting a cross-state air pollution rule is a 
good example of this phenomenon.342 
Moreover, even if the scientific and economic foundations of 
statutes are sound, the regulatory rules developed to enforce them 
may not necessarily be workable. In some instances, EPA staff might 
“lack [the] field experience and exposure to industry” that are 
necessary to write high quality regulations.343 And, even when rules 
are workable, environmental regulations in particular are 
extraordinarily complex and technocratic: 
 Perhaps the central defining feature of environmental law in the 
United States is its mind-numbing complexity and detail. . . . Today 
there is no serious question that environmental law is the most 	  
336 Kaplow, supra note 319, at 564. 
337 Eagle, supra note 323, at 618–19; Kaplow, supra note 319, at 563–64. 
338 Butler, supra note 14, at 718. 
339 See id. at 715–20 (describing the advantages tort law’s flexibility). 
340 Butler, supra note 14, at 705–06; Kaswan, supra note 68, at 100; Klass 2007, supra 
note 157, at 551–56, 592–95; Meiners & Yandle, supra note 23, at 959; Sangi, supra note 
11, at 519. 
341 Meiners & Yandle, supra note 23, at 959. 
342 Although the science to understand air pollution has advanced, the CAA is not 
written in a way that is conducive to regulating cross-state air pollution, and the statute’s 
limitations are impeding EPA’s ability to enact a rule that will pass judicial scrutiny. See 
EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(rejecting EPA’s attempt to regulate cross-state air pollution); Sangi, supra note 11, at 
498–501; Matthew L. Wald, Court Blocks E.P.A. Rule on Cross-State Pollution, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/22/science/earth/appeals-court    
-strikes-down-epa-rule-on-cross-state-pollution.html?_r=0. 
343 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
THE NATION’S HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM AT A CROSSROADS 37 
(1990). 
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complicated and detailed body of law the world has ever known; we 
have won the (dubious) distinction of representing the “state of the 
art” in legal complexity and detail.344  
The bottom line is that environmental regulation—whether expressed 
through standards or rules, the common law or regulation—will 
challenge the understanding of citizens, businesses, judges, 
regulators, and representatives simply because the environment and 
the various pathways by which pollution may harm it and human 
health are fantastically complex. 
A fundamental element in the discussion of efficiency and 
institutions, therefore, is the capacity of those institutions to gather 
and make use of information.345 Information is the life force of 
environmental and public health protection. The development of 
environmental statutes and regulations requires immense amounts of 
scientific and economic data on, for example, the chemical and 
physical processes that generate the pollution externality, the 
chemical and biological reactions that occur when ecosystems and 
humans are exposed to the pollution in varying amounts and over 
varying periods of time, the costs and benefits of available pollution 
abatement technologies, and the costs and benefits of various policy 
instruments. The cost of gathering information, therefore, represents 
an acute transaction cost, making it an important factor to consider in 
comparative institutional analysis.346 
Many scholars assume that the information gathering capacity of 
regulatory agencies far exceeds that of the judicial system.347 
However, information asymmetries skewed toward regulated 
industries greatly limit regulatory authorities’ information gathering 
capabilities.348 Imperfect as it is, the inclusion of judicial institutions 
in the regulatory process is vitally important in many environmental 	  
344 E. Donald Elliott, The Last Great Clean Air Act Book?, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 321, 326–30 
(1998) (reviewing THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK (Robert J. Martineau & David P. 
Novello eds., 1998)); see also Sangi, supra note 11, at 521 (“[T]he SIP process is not a 
model of clarity.”); John-Mark Stensvaag, The Not So Fine Print of Environmental Law, 
27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1093, 1093 (1994) (“The Clean Air Act’s comparison to the tax 
code is legendary. And the federal hazardous waste regulations defy the comprehension of 
any one person.”). 
345 Wagner, supra note 263, at 695. 
346 See Viscusi, supra note 17, at 71–72 (explaining that the tort system imposes 
information costs on all parties while regulatory rules do not). 
347 Wagner, supra note 263, at 696. 
348 Id. at 696–701. But see Adelman & Duncan, supra note 5, at 24–25 (indicating that 
many firms are unaware of the effects of their business operations on human health or the 
environment); Shavell 1984, supra note 3, at 369–70; Viscusi, supra note 17, at 75–77. 
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policy-making contexts because of the judicial system’s ability to 
facilitate information gathering for three primary reasons. 
First, the design of many regulations requires access to information 
that only private citizens have regarding the nature and extent of the 
harm.349 The plaintiff knows more about the cost of her injury than 
anyone else, and the defendant knows more about the cost of 
precaution or abatement than anyone else.350 From a purely 
theoretical economic perspective, this makes rational sense. To design 
an efficient regulatory scheme—one that maximizes social welfare—
regulators need to know the slopes of both the social marginal cost 
curve and the social marginal benefits curve of the target populations. 
Marginal costs and benefits could take the form of abatement costs 
and benefits (e.g., the costs of controlling pollution and the benefit to 
individuals from less exposure to pollutants) or emissions costs and 
benefits (e.g., the cost of harm from pollution and the benefits of 
production). Most of this information comes from private individuals 
and entities. Environmental goods are notoriously hard to price,351 
and all parties have an economic incentive to exaggerate costs.352  
Because regulators have access to imperfect information, the 
regulations they design often provide inefficient under-protection in 
some instances and overprotection in others353: “When one combines 
the elusiveness of the problem with the indeterminacy of its cause and 
multiplies that by the number and diversity of the people whose lives 
the agency is attempting to change, the probability of error is very 
high indeed.”354 
Of course, agencies do have a range of information gathering 
techniques available to them. As Justice Breyer notes, regulatory 
agencies collect information from regulated industries, public interest 	  
349 KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 40, at 104 (“[T]he information needed to write 
rules . . . is not solely in the hands of the public sector. On the contrary, those who know 
the most about the area affected by the rule are those in the regulated or benefiting 
community.”); Brennan, supra note 88, at 56–57; Hylton, supra note 57, at 524–25; Klass 
2007, supra note 157, at 582; Logue, supra note 4, at 2320–21; Meiners & Yandle, supra 
note 23, at 958; Ruhl, supra note 64, at 778; Shavell 1984, supra note 3, at 359–60. 
350 Hylton, supra note 57, at 524–25. 
351 For example, economists must often use imperfect willingness-to-pay surveys to 
place a monetary value on certain environmental goods. KOLSTAD, supra note 19, at 135–
38. 
352 McGarity 2002, supra note 118, at 549, 559–63. 
353 Kaplow, supra note 319, at 599–600; Kolstad et al., supra note 5, at 889. 
354 KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 40, at 101–02; see also HENRY N. BUTLER & 
JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 27–28 
(1996) (describing the limits of regulatory information gathering). 
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groups, external experts, and government research offices.355 In 
addition, agencies attain information through public comments 
received during the notice and comment process and through 
participants in negotiated rulemaking procedures.356 In spite of 
information asymmetries and barriers to regulatory information 
gathering, agencies do gather and generate an incredible amount of 
data that they use to promulgate some of the most sophisticated 
regulatory programs ever designed.357 
Liability standards of care, on the other hand, are broad enough to 
apply to the gamut of harms to human health and the environment that 
regulations may be too narrow to protect against. Moreover, private 
litigation has facilitated the generation of a great deal of public health 
data on many industrial chemicals and pharmaceuticals, most 
prominently tobacco and asbestos.358 Although litigants develop tort 
law one case at a time, the accumulation of precedent over time has 
incorporated private information into robust public standards of care: 
 A public regulatory scheme could not hope to match the 
negligence system in terms of its scope, detail, and encapsulation of 
private information. To do so would require public agents to 
discover ex ante how much a potential victim would be hurt by a 
specific injury, and how much it would cost a potential injurer to 
avoid the injury. Even if the parties were able to provide this 
information ex ante, their incentives to do so honestly would be 
weak.359  
Second, private attorneys are often more effective at uncovering 
misconduct than regulatory agencies—a strength of the adversarial 
	  
355 KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 40, at 102 (citing STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION 
AND ITS REFORM 110 (1982)); see also Peter K. Manning, The Limits of Knowledge: The 
Role of Information in Regulation, in MAKING REGULATORY POLICY 49 (Keith Hawkins 
& John Thomas eds., 1989); McGarity 2007, supra note 193, at 1049. 
356 KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 40, at 168–70, 205–10. 
357 McGarity 2007, supra note 193, at 1049; see also Brennan, supra note 88, at 48–54; 
Klass 2007, supra note 157, at 592–95. 
358 Wagner, supra note 263, at 711–12 (discussing litigation against breast implant 
manufacturers). Wagner also makes the point that even when advances in science show 
litigation to be misinformed, the value of the data generated from the litigation may 
outweigh the costs of its production. Id. at 713–14. 
359 Hylton, supra note 57, at 525. Hylton may be employing hyperbole here, but the 
point remains that the tort system is adept at incorporating private information. See also 
Kaplow, supra note 319, at 616 (indicating that standards are easier to update given new 
information than regulatory rules). But see Buck, supra note 124, at 633–34 (questioning 
that local parties may provide better information than agencies can gather). 
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system.360 The tort system empowers private litigators with the 
capacity to compel their opponents to disclose full and complete 
information during pre-trial discovery and provides attorneys with 
incentives to “spend the resources necessary to copy and organize 
documents, take depositions, and fight . . . efforts to resist 
discovery.”361 Plaintiffs’ attorneys are willing to spend those 
resources because the court can often shift those costs to the tortfeasor 
as attorneys’ fees when the plaintiff emerges victorious. 
Third, the tort system does not rely exclusively on the deterrent 
effects of precedent to send signals to the market. Indeed, companies 
must often purchase liability insurance to protect themselves in the 
case of an accident.362 Insurance companies gather massive amounts 
of information in order to price risk into premiums, and premiums in 
turn send price signals to businesses about their levels of risk. In this 
way, the tort system marshals insurance companies as secondary 
standard-setters. One limitation to this attribute of tort law, though, is 
that many insurance policies often exclude coverage for toxic torts.363 
In addition to its information-gathering function, tort law may 
facilitate more effective enforcement of public regulation and vice 
versa. Knowing that private litigators could uncover misconduct or 
manipulation of the regulatory process, industry may be more candid 
when working with or providing information to regulatory 
agencies.364 Private litigation may also produce information that may 
be useful in regulatory settings. For example, “an ecosystem services 
nuisance case is likely to generate information about natural capital 
and ecosystem service values that would not normally be produced 
from regulatory programs, yet which could be generalizable to many 
other similar settings and added to the storehouse of information.”365 	  
360 MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS 
TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 15 (1996); Abraham, supra note 5, at 391; Margaret A. 
Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of Justice and 
Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2150 (1997); E. Donald Elliott, The Future of 
Toxic Torts: Of Chemophobia, Risk as a Compensable Injury and Hybrid Compensation 
Systems, 25 HOUS. L. REV. 781, 788 (1988); Hylton, supra note 57, at 525; McGarity 
2002, supra note 118, at 571, 579; Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to 
Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899, 923 (1996); Wagner, supra note 263, at 697–709. 
361 McGarity 2002, supra note 118, at 571; see also McGarity 2007, supra note 193, at 
1029. 
362 COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 14, at 283–85. 
363 APPLEGATE ET AL., supra note 86, at 120–21. 
364 McGarity 2002, supra note 118, at 571. 
365 Ruhl, supra note 64, at 778. Ruhl concludes that “investment in experts and the civil 
litigation discovery process will unquestionably yield specific and general information 
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Moreover, information generated through litigation could facilitate 
regulatory enforcement actions.366 For example, private litigation 
against DuPont for injuries from the perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) 
that it used in its Teflon manufacturing process revealed documents 
that encouraged EPA to bring a TSCA enforcement action against the 
company, which settled for $16.5 million.367 In more extreme cases, a 
series of tort suits on a novel harm could prompt the federal and state 
governments to enact entirely new environmental statutes368 or 
highlight inadequacies of existing ones.369 Operating in the opposite 
direction, information gathered by regulatory agencies can be used in 
litigation or to enhance tort law’s deterrent effect by increasing firms’ 
awareness of their liability exposure.370 
Fourth, regulatory agencies encounter asymmetries in information 
that are skewed in favor of industry.371 For example, to determine 
whether a certain practice or product meets safety or performance 
standards or licensing requirements, agencies often rely on 
information submitted by the regulated firms themselves. Regulatory 
agencies, including EPA, are “heavily dependent upon regulated 
entities for the scientific information that they need to support 
effective regulation.”372 The primary environmental statutes do not 
require companies to submit all relevant data on the risks associated 
with their activities and products, nor do the statutes empower EPA 
with a great deal of authority to require companies to submit that 
information.373 Even though EPA does have some limited authority to 
affirmatively subpoena information or require companies to generate 
new data that it believes it needs, political pressures and limited 	  
about natural capital and ecosystem services values, actions that degrade their delivery, 
and alternatives that could be adopted in land use to avoid such injuries.” Id. at 779. 
366 Wagner, supra note 263, at 695–96; Abraham, supra note 5, at 391. 
367 Wagner, supra note 263, at 712–13; see also McGarity 2007, supra note 193, at 
1050–51. 
368 Kaswan, supra note 68, at 100; Johnson, supra note 66, at 599–600; Wagner, supra 
note 263, at 710 (“[T]he deficiencies that afflict the court system are dwarfed by much 
more serious problems that paralyze the regulatory process. Litigation thus serves a vital 
role in dropping inflated information costs and sparking public understanding and debate 
that in turn jump-starts the market and political process.”). 
369 Buzbee, supra note 19, at 1578. 
370 Kaswan, supra note 68, at 103; Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis 
of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 418–19 (1994) 
[hereinafter Schwartz 1994]. 
371 Wagner, supra note 263, at 696–701. 
372 McGarity 2002, supra note 118, at 549. 
373 Wagner, supra note 263, at 698–99. 
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resources have discouraged EPA from liberally using this 
authority.374 Even when EPA does acquire information, it sometimes 
yields to industry requests to shield that data from public disclosure 
by classifying it as confidential business information.375 
Moreover, it is not uncommon for regulatees to withhold or 
provide misleading scientific information to regulators.376 For many 
practices and products—pharmaceuticals and industrial chemicals, for 
example—regulated firms generate or receive commissioned data on 
safety hazards and risks confidentially.377 Upon finding results 
counter to its business interests, a company might elect to withhold 
the data from the regulator on the justification that the information is 
unreliable or invalid.378 Even when the data is both reliable and valid, 
some companies decide to withhold it from the government—often 
illegally—out of fear that the data will incite adverse regulatory or 
enforcement action.379 Examples of products for which companies 
have withheld important scientific data include pharmaceuticals such 
as bendectin, the MER-29 anti-cholesterol drug, and the morning 
sickness drug; dozens of pesticides; and tobacco.380 Regulatees may 
manipulate data as well in efforts to secure favorable regulatory 
outcomes.381 One strategy that pharmaceutical manufacturers have 
used has been to “ghost write” seemingly impartial epidemiological 
studies supporting their products.382 More egregious examples 
include toxicological studies for pesticides that were outright 
forged.383 A more subtle approach has been for companies to employ 
consultants to publish articles discrediting studies that find their 
products to have adverse effects on human health or the 
environment.384 The adversarial nature of the judicial system makes 
tort law less susceptible to such data manipulation. 
	  
374 Id. 
375 Id. at 699–700. 
376 Id. at 728; MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 286; McGarity 2002, supra note 118, 
at 559–63. 
377 McGarity 2002, supra note 118, at 559. 
378 Id. at 559–60. 
379 Id. 
380 Id.; Wade Roush et al., Publishing Sensitive Data: Who Calls the Shots?, 276 
SCIENCE 523, 523–24 (1997). 
381 McGarity 2002, supra note 118, at 560–63. 
382 Id. at 561. 
383 Id. at 562. 
384 Id. at 562–63. 
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The primary active agents within the judicial system—judges, 
juries, and attorneys—however, do not usually possess the technical 
expertise necessary to design workable and optimal standards. 
Regulators at administrative agencies, on the other hand, are scientific 
and policy experts with explicit delegated authority from Congress to 
design and carry out regulations to enforce statutory mandates.385 In 
preemption cases, courts are especially quick and emphatic in 
highlighting their own lack of expertise in areas of science and 
policy.386 Indeed, in the matter of expertise, public regulations have a 
clear advantage over liability standards. Successful implementation of 
environmental regulation requires the resolution of complicated 
scientific and political issues, and the judicial system, because of its 
adversarial nature and blunt remedies, is hardly the best venue within 
which to settle those issues.387 
Judges and juries, though, are not flying blindly into the abyss each 
time they are confronted with environmental litigation. Attorneys 
have the benefit of presenting the court with experts to provide sworn 
scientific testimony that is directly relevant to the case at hand.388 To 
establish causation, a plaintiff must show a cause-effect relationship 
between, for example, exposure to a toxic substance and harm to her 
health or economic wellbeing—a showing that often requires 
epidemiological studies.389 Yet, courts do not have the authority to 
commission such studies.390 Plaintiffs must instead rely on existing 
studies—which may even include data compiled by administrative 
agencies—or fund new ones themselves.391 Studies that can be 
replicated or that have been peer reviewed have become increasingly 
important in products liability and toxic tort cases following Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.392  	  
385 For comparisons of the expertise of the judicial system and regulatory agencies, see 
Kaswan, supra note 68, at 102; Kaplow, supra note 319, at 608–10; Posner, supra note 
229, at 19–20; and Shleifer, supra note 314, at 34–39. 
386 See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E. 2d 870 (N.Y. 1970); North 
Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth. (TVA), 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010). 
387 Cane, supra note 17, at 462–63; Czarnezki & Thomsen, supra note 23, at 5. 
388 KOMESAR, supra note 24, at 140–42; Kaswan, supra note 68, at 102; Klass 2007, 
supra note 157, at 582; McGarity 2007, supra note 193, at 1032–33; Sangi, supra note 11, 
at 521. 
389 APPLEGATE ET AL., supra note 86, at 68; McGarity 2007, supra note 193, at 1032. 
390 McGarity 2007, supra note 193, at 1032. 
391 Kaswan, supra note 68, at 103; McGarity 2007, supra note 193, at 1032; Meiners & 
Yandle, supra note 23, at 962. 
392 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see PROJECT ON SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE & PUB. POL’Y, 
DAUBERT: THE MOST INFLUENTIAL SUPREME COURT RULING YOU’VE NEVER HEARD OF 
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The Supreme Court in Daubert held that federal judges should 
function as gatekeepers (or “amateur scientists” as Chief Justice 
Rehnquist put it)393 to determine the admissibility of expert testimony 
according to four non-exclusive criteria: whether the evidence is 
based on a testable theory or technique, has been peer reviewed, has 
acceptable error rates, and has been generally accepted by the 
scientific community.394 Industry defendants have successfully used 
the Daubert test to significantly raise the bar for plaintiffs seeking to 
establish causation with expert testimony in federal courts and many 
state courts that have adopted the test.395 A more fruitful strategy for 
plaintiffs has been to mine defendants’ files for scientific information 
or evidence that the defendant had advance notice of the risks posed 
by its products or activity.396 
Of course, if Congress were to employ a liability entitlement as a 
policy instrument in a future environmental statute, it would have the 
authority to determine not only the liability standard, but also what 
evidence the plaintiff could present. That is, Congress could legislate 
around the Daubert test if it were to create a new right of action 
within a new federal regulatory program. Moreover, if Congress were 
to include a liability entitlement as part of a regulatory scheme, then 
that standard would be developed with the same expertise that goes 
into every other public regulatory instrument. And even with 
limitations on the expertise available to courts, it is not clear that the 
expertise of agency staff necessarily makes public regulatory 
instruments the best choice in all instances. As noted above, not all 
regulatory rules are created equal: some rules prove to be unworkable 
while others fall prey to the influence of interest groups. What’s 
more, appeals are often made to the judiciary to clarify vague 
regulatory language. Nevertheless, no judgment can be made without 
discussing the comparative effectiveness of tort law and public 
regulation. The following subsection addresses that issue. 
	  
(2003) [hereinafter DAUBERT], available at http://www.defendingscience.org/site/default 
/files/upload/Daubert-The-Most-Influential-Supreme-Court-Decision-You-ve-Never-
Heard-Of-2003.pdf; McGarity 2007, supra note 193, at 1032–33. 
393 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 601 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
394 Id. at 592–95. 
395 DAUBERT, supra note 392, at 4. 
396 McGarity 2007, supra note 193, at 1032. 
ABELKOP (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/14  4:45 PM 
452 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92, 2 
D. Effectiveness & Cost-Effectiveness 
Whereas the efficiency question calls for a determination of which 
institution may set the most optimal standards, the question of 
effectiveness asks which institution is most likely to achieve its policy 
objectives, and the cost-effectiveness criterion asks which policy will 
achieve its goal at the lowest cost. Tort law operates as a regulatory 
tool through its general deterrence function, so a discussion of the 
effectiveness of tort law must center on the empirical success of its 
deterrence signal and the host of factors that muddle that signal. 
Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of tort law’s deterrence signal 
yields mixed results, and no study is dispositive.397 
However, in his review of empirical studies, surveys of businesses, 
journalist reports, and original research on general deterrence, Gary 
Schwartz concludes that “tort law provides something significant by 
way of deterrence.”398 What’s more, a mass of case studies—
litigation on asbestos, methyl tertiary-butyl ether, PFOA, and others, 
for example—demonstrates that tort law can be an effective and often 
necessary policy instrument.399 Much of the contemporary 
quantitative literature on general deterrence focuses on citizen suits 
and regulatory enforcement actions.400 That body of literature 	  
397 For a thorough review of the empirical literature on tort law, see W. Jonathan Cardi 
et al., Does Tort Law Deter Individuals? A Behavioral Science Study, 9 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 567, 571–76 (2012) (finding that tort law does not have a general deterrent 
effect, although there are methodological limitations to the study). See also WILLIAM M. 
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 4–7, 10, 58, 
161–62 (1987); JAY P. SHIMSHACK, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE 
ASSURANCE & OFFICE OF RESEARCH & DEV., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, MONITORING, 
ENFORCEMENT, & ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE: UNDERSTANDING SPECIFIC & 
GENERAL DETERRENCE (2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources 
/reports/compliance/research/meec-whitepaper.pdf (providing a detailed account of the 
empirical literature on general and specific deterrence); Tom Baker et al., The Virtues of 
Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443 (2004); Popper, 
supra note 22, at 189–97 (labeling those who argue against the deterrence effect 
“deterrence deniers”); Schwartz 1994, supra note 370 (reviewing empirical and theoretical 
literature on the deterrent effect of tort law). 
398 Schwartz 1994, supra note 370, at 443. But see Schroeder, supra note 44, at 591–93 
(indicating that the effectiveness of tort law’s deterrence signal is a contentious issue); 
Buck, supra note 124, at 630–33 (describing an ideal, if not impossible, study). 
399 Czarnezki & Thomsen, supra note 23, at 6–7; McGarity 2005, supra note 170, at 
401. 
400 See Gray & Shimshack, supra note 53; Christian Langpap & Jay P. Shimshack, 
Private Citizen Suits and Public Enforcement: Substitutes or Complements?, 59 J. ENVTL. 
ECON. & MGMT. 235 (2010); Jay P. Shimshack & Michael B. Ward, Enforcement and 
Over-Compliance, 55 J. ENVTL ECON. & MGMT. 90 (2008); Jay P. Shimshack & Michael 
B. Ward, Regulator Reputation, Enforcement, and Environmental Compliance, 50 J. 
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suggests that enforcement actions have general deterrence effects that 
stem not only from the threat of legal sanctions, but also from the 
social stigma of being viewed as a polluter.401 Moreover, enforcement 
actions against other companies have also been found to serve a 
“reassurance function”—informing cautious businesses that their 
investments in safety are worthwhile—and as a “reminder 
mechanism”—to encourage them to maintain their equipment, 
monitoring practices, employee safety training, and the like.402 There 
is no reason why the deterrence signal of tort law should not operate 
in the same way as that of citizen enforcement suits. 
Of course, the best measure of the cost-effectiveness of liability as 
a general deterrent would really lie in cases that never materialize 
because firms took precautionary measures that they otherwise would 
not have taken were it not for the looming threat of litigation. That 
data, however, would be difficult if not impossible to obtain. When 
firms take precautionary measures, the threat of being sued is only 
one of many reasons, if it even is one at all. However, Shavell argues 
that governance costs for liability entitlements are generally less than 
those for public regulatory instruments for that very reason: a well-
functioning liability standard theoretically means that parties, having 
taken due care, will not engage the machinery of the judicial system 
at all.403 Additionally, it is usually cheaper for parties to settle out of 
court than undergo a trial. Finally, the government, through 
regulation, must spend resources whether or not the regulation is 
effective. The potential for liability, on the other hand, only affects 
the behavior of the targeted group of firms most likely to cause harm, 
and the government will only incur administrative costs if harm 
actually occurs.404 Regulating through a liability standard may 
therefore avoid many of the governance costs and impacts on public 
finance that burden many regulatory programs. 
However, a number of factors function to mitigate the general 
deterrence signal—and hence the overall effectiveness—of tort 
litigation as a policy tool. These factors include firms’ imperfect 
perceptions of their exposure to liability, plaintiffs’ high transaction 
costs, and managers’ cognitive limitations. 	  
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 519 (2005) (evaluating the general deterrence effects of 
regulatory enforcement actions); Thornton et al., supra note 53. 
401 Thornton et al., supra note 53, at 263–66. 
402 Id. at 278–83. 
403 Shavell 1984, supra note 4, at 364. 
404 Id. 
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First, the effectiveness of tort law’s ability to act as a deterrent 
relies on firms’ perceptions of the probability that they will be held 
liable for injuries that they cause. The probability that a risk-taker will 
be held liable includes the probabilities that the harm will be detected, 
that the harm will be attributed to the risk-taking firm, that the firm 
will be sued, and that the firm will incur some cost through a 
settlement, a penalty, or bad publicity.405 Uncertainty as to any of 
these probabilities can lead to inefficient overprotection by risk-
averse firms and underprotection by less cautious firms.406 If firms 
fail to take due care in their business operations, but are not held 
liable, then tort law as a policy instrument will provide a suboptimal 
deterrence signal.407 That a firm may only be held liable for the 
injuries it causes as opposed to the risks it takes is a key factor that 
mutes tort law’s deterrence signal.408 
Additionally, plaintiffs are often encumbered with high transaction 
costs. Any litigation is generally expensive to begin with. 
Environmental tort plaintiffs, however, encounter additional barriers. 
A plaintiff may be unsure whether she should be a plaintiff at all. That 
is, it is sometimes difficult for a plaintiff to establish general and 
specific causation by linking her disease with exposure to a pollutant, 
thereby distinguishing the cause of her disease from other potential 
causes. Even when a plaintiff is certain that exposure to pollution has 
injured her, determining the identity of the defendant can be a 
difficult task given the long latency of many diseases and the 
possibility that there are many potential defendants.409 
Furthermore, the diffuse nature of pollution-related injuries may 
require many plaintiffs to come together in class actions. The 
presence of multiple plaintiffs raises the possibility that they may 
encounter a collective action problem and free-riding by plaintiffs 
who join only after the first mover has undertaken the expense of 
initiating litigation. And while diffuse harm in the aggregate may rise 
to the level of an actionable tort, the injury to any one person may not 	  
405 Hylton, supra note 57, at 519. 
406 KOLSTAD, supra note 19, at 386. 
407 Id.; see also Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & 
ECON. 1, 29 (1959) (arguing that high transaction costs may necessitate regulatory action); 
Kolstad et al., supra note 5, at 889. 
408 Abraham, supra note 5, at 389; Adelman & Duncan, supra note 5, 27–30; Brennan, 
supra note 88, at 45–47, 61–64; Cane, supra note 17, at 434–35, 443–44; Gifford, supra 
note 40, at 615–16; Rabin, supra note 110, at 43. 
409 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 5, at 27–28; Buck, supra note 124, at 637–38; 
Rabin, supra note 110, at 43. 
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be large enough to rise to that level. “As a general rule, the 
probability of suit drops as the stake of any given person declines or 
the delay after which harm occurs grows.”410 Each of these 
transaction costs diminishes the deterrent effect of tort law because 
polluting firms perceive them, know that they reduce the likelihood 
that a suit will be brought, and discount the probability of being held 
accountable for taking risks. 
Of course, even when a suit is brought, it cannot serve as much of a 
deterrent if the defendant is not found liable.411 Inconsistency in the 
application of liability standards and the outcomes of litigation over 
time and across jurisdictions is a final source of uncertainty that 
muddles tort law’s deterrent signal.412 
Second, defendants’ capital constraints diminish the deterrent 
effect of tort standards.413 A civil penalty levied on a firm is 
necessarily limited by that company’s capacity to pay for it. The 
potential for bankruptcy, therefore, “operate[s] as a de facto cap on 
potential liability.”414 This weakens firms’ incentive to take 
precautionary measures because companies will not consider costs 
that exceed their assets.415 It also provides an incentive for large 
companies to separate their risk-generating operations into smaller, 
low-capital corporations with distinct corporate identities.416 On the 
other hand, a company’s inability to pay is immaterial under most 
pubic regulatory instruments.417  
Third, the decision-making capacity of individuals is constrained 
by bounded rationality, opportunism, and other cognitive biases.418 
Firm managers that are willing to take risks tend to be overly 
optimistic in underestimating the risks that their business decisions 
	  
410 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 5, at 25. 
411 Schroeder, supra note 44, at 598. 
412 Kaswan, supra note 68, at 101. 
413 KOLSTAD, supra note 19, at 386; Adelman & Duncan, supra note 5, at 25; Hylton, 
supra note 57, at 529; Kolstad et al., supra note 5, at 889; Menell, supra note 44, at 101–
02; Schroeder, supra note 44, at 592; Shavell 1984, supra note 3, at 360–62. 
414 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 5, at 25. 
415 Buck, supra note 124, at 636; Posner, supra note 229, at 17; Shavell 1984, supra 
note 3, at 360–61; Shleifer, supra note 314, at 32–33. But see Roisman et al., supra note 
209, at 225–26 (refuting this argument). 
416 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 5, at 25. 
417 Shavell 1984, supra note 3, at 360–61. 
418 WILLIAMSON, supra note 29, at 29, 44–47; see generally Daniel W. Shuman, The 
Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 115 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997). 
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entail.419 This irrationality is compounded by a timeframe disjuncture 
between the tenure of managers and the manifestation of long-latency 
risks.420 The long timeframe in which diseases may develop or be 
discovered encourages firm managers to discount the potential long-
term cost of liability for those injuries in favor of short-term profits 
needed to please shareholders, especially considering that the harm 
may not become apparent until long after the managers have left their 
firms. Finally, a manager may believe that even if her company is 
held liable for injuries resulting from her decisions, she may not be 
held directly responsible. The potential to avoid personal 
responsibility may therefore further encourage risky decision-
making.421 
In spite of these limitations that impede tort law’s deterrence effect, 
Anthony Roisman et al. argue that businesses do not entirely discount 
the threat of litigation. Insurance companies account for the risk of 
liability when calculating premiums, giving firms an incentive to 
increase safety.422 Those who have a long-term stake in a company—
the board of directors, shareholders, and banks—“are unlikely to 
tolerate management creating financial time bombs by failing to be 
sensitive to the dangers of using and disposing of toxic substances 
and products.”423 Furthermore, pre-sale due diligence reviews 
examine potential liability, providing those groups with an extra 
incentive to ensure their firm is taking due care, lest they jeopardize 
the future sale of the company.424 Finally, defense lawyers who 
advise their clients on regulatory compliance also counsel them on 
potential liability.425 
Critics of tort law often point out that nuisance was the primary 
regulatory tool prior to the 1970s, and it failed miserably, 
necessitating the enactment of federal environmental laws.426 
Defenders of tort law, though, contend that pollution was already 
declining by the 1970s, and improving environmental quality cannot 
	  
419 Schroeder, supra note 44, at 592. 
420 Adelman & Duncan, supra note 5, at 28; Menell, supra note 44, at 102; Schroeder, 
supra note 44, at 592. 
421 Menell, supra note 44, at 102; Shavell 1984, supra note 4, at 362. 
422 Roisman et al., supra note 209, at 222. 
423 Id. 
424 Id. at 222–23.  
425 Popper, supra note 22, at 196–97; Roisman et al., supra note 209, at 222. 
426 Buck, supra note 124, at 630–31; Cross, supra note 187, at 977–80. 
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be (at least entirely) attributed to federal programs.427 Recall that 
environmental quality is a superior good. And, to the extent that tort 
law failed, the historical factors limiting its effectiveness in the early 
20th Century—mostly procedural factors limiting the ability of 
plaintiffs to bring suit—are no longer present.428  
Roger Meiners and Bruce Yandle, on the other hand, argue that tort 
law was historically “too strict for those who wanted to generate 
pollution with greater impunity.”429 Regulatory permits under the 
CAA or CWA, for example, may act as sanctions to pollute, 
providing the basis for a preemption claim or a compliance 
defense.430  Whereas tort standards vary across jurisdictions, federal 
regulatory mandates are uniform across the nation, providing 
businesses with more predictable rules to follow.431 Special interests 
have a greater ability to influence the outcomes of the regulatory 
process than private lawsuits. Notably, industry has been able to 
shape federal environmental regulation to facilitate rent seeking by 
establishing stricter mandates on new facilities than on existing 
ones—a feat that would not have been possible through liability 
standards.432 Generally, regulatory fines for noncompliance are less 
cumbersome than penalties assessed by juries.433 Regulations also 
give industry greater lengths of time to comply than tort remedies 
do.434 Finally, just as with tort law, uniform regulations have variable, 
often muddled enforcement. 
In a discussion of policy instruments, though, it is difficult to judge 
the effectiveness of tort law against public regulation without 
discussing the relative strengths and weaknesses of the various public 
regulatory instruments, including taxes, subsidies, marketable 
allowances, technology standards, licensing schemes, and the like. 
The circumstances in which each of those instruments will perform 
optimally vary as well. There are, however, several general factors 
	  
427 See Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History of 
Environmental Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 89 (2002); Yandle, supra note 220, 
at 658–61. 
428 Butler, supra note 14, at 727–30. 
429 Meiners & Yandle, supra note 23, at 956; see also Yandle, supra note 220, at 655 
(defending this argument). 
430 Meiners & Yandle, supra note 23, at 956. 
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that limit the overall effectiveness of public regulation in the United 
States: transaction costs, politics, and limitations on public resources. 
Regulators encounter different types of implementation costs than 
tort plaintiffs face. When confronted with a public health problem, 
regulators and congressional staffers tasked with drafting legislation 
face a great deal of uncertainty. As noted above, they have to 
understand the physical and chemical processes that generate the 
pollution externality, the chemical and biological reactions that occur 
when ecosystems and humans are exposed to the pollution in varying 
amounts over varying periods of time, the production costs and 
benefits of available pollution control technologies, and the costs and 
benefits of various policy instruments. What’s more, for a policy to 
function efficiently, economists must first pinpoint the socially 
optimal level of economic activity, where the marginal costs of 
abatement to the polluters are equal to the marginal benefits of 
abatement to the victims. Reaching this determination is itself a 
daunting task, which often requires placing a price tag on human life: 
How does one weigh the immediate economic costs of regulation 
against the risk, for example, that one person in 10,000 of the at-risk 
population might develop cancer years in the future? Even with all of 
the evidence that modern science and economics provide, decision 
makers face cognitive limitations and biases.435 Firms also tend to 
opportunistically conceal information from regulators. Regulators, 
therefore, are confronted with tough decisions at every turn in the 
policy process.436 
At the very center of every decision made at every stage of the 
policy-making process, though, is politics.437  In fact, politics—not 
scientific or economic efficiency considerations—motivates many 
environmental regulatory decisions, especially those to delay or block 
regulations from being enacted.438  Courts often praise the CAA and 	  
435 BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 268, at 33; HERBERT A. SIMON, 
ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN 
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION, at xxiv (2d ed. 1957); WILLIAMSON, supra note 29, at 
45; Shuman, supra note 419; Sunstein, supra note 418. 
436 See Buzbee, supra note 19, at 1593–96 (reviewing the causes of regulatory failure). 
437 BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 268, at 33. 
438 See Robin Bravender, Obama Ozone Decision Blindsides Enviros—and His Own 
EPA, POLITICO (Sept. 2, 2011, 6:02 PM EDT), http://www.politico.com/news/stories 
/0911/62586.html (“EPA officials were not involved in the decision-making process.”); 
Juliet Eilperin, Obama Pulls Back Proposed Smog Standards in Victory for Business, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-09-02/national 
/35274851_1_ground-level-ozone-burdens-and-regulatory-uncertainty-smog-standards 
(discussing the political motivations behind President Obama’s decision to delay EPA’s 
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CWA, for example, as being comprehensive programs, carefully 
crafted to encourage polluters to engage in the socially optimal levels 
of activity and abatement.439 This vision is far from reality, and 
politics is the explanation. Federal environmental laws, including the 
CAA and CWA, are examples of what Frank Baumgartner and others 
have labeled incrementalism: 
[T]he notion that decision makers search comprehensively through 
all available alternatives and evidence before reaching a decision on 
the most appropriate route to take . . . . seems hopelessly idealistic   
. . . . [T]he way people make decisions in the real world is to 
quickly limit their thinking to a small number of realistic 
alternatives and then choose a pragmatic course of action. And that 
course may not be the most effective solution, merely the one that 
most will agree to, the one that is most easily available, or one of 
several that is “good enough,” even though it may not necessarily 
be the absolute best. The consequence of this process is that over 
time, policy making moves in small steps.440  
The CAA and CWA, intricate as they are, are nonetheless wrought 
with complications typical of incremental policymaking—where 
politics determines outcomes more than effectiveness or efficiency 
criteria. For example, political stumbling blocks kept EPA from 
enacting substantial regulations for hazardous air pollutants for 
twenty years,441 and EPA has been unable to develop a judicially 
acceptable cross-state air pollution rule. The CAA includes 
technology standards rather than performance standards due to the 
influence of eastern coal interests,442 and the CWA fails to address 
non-point source pollution due to the influence of agricultural 
	  
promulgation of new regulations on ground level ozone); Deborah Solomon, EPA to Ease 
Rule on Power Plants, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001 
424052970203791904576611370921020358.html (discussing the political motivations 
behind President Obama’s decision to curb EPA’s July 2011 rule on interstate air 
pollution). 
439 See, e.g., North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth. (TVA), 615 F.3d 291, 
298 (4th Cir. 2010); Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 903 F. Supp. 2d 314, 322 (W.D. 
Penn. 2012). 
440 BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 268, at 32; see also LAZARUS, supra note 95, at 
169–70 (explaining how federal environmental laws are incrementalist in nature); 
Brennan, supra note 88, at 27–38 (critiquing federal environmental risk reduction for 
being incrementalist). 
441 Brennan, supra note 88, at 33. 
442 See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY 
AIR: OR HOW THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR 
HIGH-SULFUR COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT (1981). 
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interests.443 Indeed, enforcement within the tort system by private 
litigation may be more insulated from the influence of special 
interests. This could give tort law another leg up vis-à-vis public 
regulation444 because heavy industry involvement in shaping 
regulatory rules has limited the effectiveness of public regulation by 
encouraging the statutory adoption of suboptimal policy instruments: 
The “worst” polluters were at the table and subscribed to a statutory 
scheme that they deemed preferable to the alternative. 
 Economists have long advocated various taxes on pollutants to 
give industries incentives to search for efficient ways to cut 
emissions. Congress, on the other hand, never showed much interest 
in this approach. By cooperating with Congress in the creation of 
command-and-control regulation, rather than “sensible” plans for 
pollution taxes advocated by economists, national industries 
obtained barriers to entry. Perhaps regulation was inevitable and 
industry just got the best deal it could given the circumstances. That 
can never be known. But no one can assert that the federal 
regulatory schemes are substantially related to dealing with alleged 
environmental problems in an effective manner, either on the basis 
of science or economic efficiency.445 
In the United States, environmental regulation is especially 
contentious because of its redistributive nature and impact on 
economic activity.446 Moreover, the beneficiaries of environmental 
policies are often diffuse, uninformed, and unmotivated relative to the 
concentrated interests representing regulated industries. The short-
termism that is pervasive in the business community, the government, 
and the public at large compounds the problem by making it 
particularly difficult for legislators to support immediate restrictions 
on the economic activity of a targeted industry in favor of abstract, 
long-term benefits spread over a wide population—even if the 
restrictions are economically efficient.447 Furthermore, the pluralistic 	  
443 Jonathan Cannon, A Bargain for Clean Water, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 608, 615 
(2008). 
444 For an additional description of how interest groups influence the public policy 
process, see BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 268, at 40–41. Interest groups have 
affected the tort system through a variety of tort reform statutes that limit causes of action. 
However, environmental torts have largely remained free from the interference of interest 
groups and limiting legislation. Klass 2009, supra note 44, at 1516, 1529–36. 
445 Meiners & Yandle, supra note 23, at 957. 
446 LAZARUS, supra note 95, at 25–29, 32–37, 40. 
447 Id. at 2, 41 (indicating that short termism makes it difficult for candidates to run on 
a pro-environment agenda because voters tend to value short-term economic gain over 
long-term and ambiguous environmental benefits); Adelman & Duncan, supra note 5, at 
30–31. 
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way in which the United States’ governance system fragments 
authority makes coalitions necessary to drive legislation through 
Congress; however, the above factors make it exceedingly difficult 
for those coalitions to effectively coalesce around environmental 
protection issues.448 
Given the state of the economy and the Republican majority in the 
House of Representatives, it is not only difficult for progressive 
legislators to enact environmental protection legislation, but it is also 
a challenge for them to prevent environmental regulations from being 
rolled back. In the first session of the 112th Congress, the House 
voted on 191 measures to undermine environmental regulations or 
limit agencies’ authority to promulgate additional rules,449 prompting 
Representative Henry Waxman to label that House as “the most anti-
environment House in the history of Congress.”450 With a gridlocked, 
anti-environment Congress, though, politics becomes an even more 
important factor to consider in environmental policy instrument 
choice. And against a background of political paralysis, the regulatory 
role of the tort law becomes ever more important as well. 
Limitations on public resources are a closely related factor to 
discuss in the choice between tort law and public regulation. 
Governance costs are a fundamental consideration within both 
Shavell’s and Richards’s policy choice frameworks. Limitations on 
public resources operate as a constraint on instrument choice due to 
the finite size of agency budgets, competing demands on agency 
resources, and restrictions on the ways in which agencies spend 
money. All public agencies have limited budgets,451 and rulemaking 
requires both human and financial resources.452 Statutes that require a 
constant high volume of rulemaking and persistent federal budget 
deficits act together to create endemic strains on agencies’ personnel 
and financial resources.453 Furthermore, there is a disjuncture 	  
448 LAZARUS, supra note 95, at 32–40. 
449  U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, MINORITY 
STAFF, THE ANTI-ENVIRONMENT RECORD OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
112TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION (2011) [hereinafter MINORITY STAFF REPORT], available 
at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?q=news/new-report-details-the-
most-anti-environment-house-in-the-history-of-congress; see also Ronald Brownstein, 
Curious Cohesion, NAT’L J., Oct. 6, 2011, available at http://www.nationaljournal.com 
/columns/political-connections/house-gop-in-lockstep-against-epa-20111006. 
450 MINORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 449.  
451 KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 40, at 95, 112; Langpap & Shimshack, supra note 
400, at 235. 
452 KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 40, at 112. 
453 Id. at 95, 112; Klass 2009, supra note 44, at 1570. 
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“between the authorizing process that creates rulemaking 
responsibilities and the appropriations process that provides the 
resources agencies need to carry them out.”454 In other words, that an 
agency receives a mandate from Congress does not mean that it will 
receive the funding or personnel necessary to fulfill that mandate. The 
appropriations process, therefore, affords Congress the opportunity to 
undercut regulations by placing strains on agency resources. EPA and 
the FDA, for example, currently find themselves in this very 
situation.455 Overall, budget and personnel constraints limit EPA’s 
ability to gather information, check data submissions from industry 
for accuracy and completeness, train personnel, police against internal 
wrongdoing, engage in the rulemaking and appeals processes, and 
initiate enforcement actions.456 
Ultimately, firms must make decisions regarding the manner in 
which they will comply with regulations—or whether they will 
comply at all.457 In doing so, companies will make the same 
calculations regarding the probability of being caught in 
noncompliance as they will in regards to the likelihood of a private 
lawsuit. If firms perceive that they will not be caught and that the 
penalty for being caught is low, then the likelihood that industry will 
comply with regulatory mandates diminishes. In practice, incomplete 
and inconsistent enforcement is not uncommon.458 
Therefore, it is not surprising when evidence suggests that 
regulatory violations are not rare either.459 A 2003 EPA report on the 	  
454 KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 40, at 112. 
455 Nicole Blake Johnson, Spending Bill Deals Steep Budget Cuts to EPA, Interior, 
FED. TIMES (July 13, 2011, 6:08 PM), http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20110713 
/AGENCY01/107130305/; Gabriel Nelson, EPA Budget Deal Slams State, Regional 
Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/04/13 
/13greenwire-epa-budget-deal-slams-state-regional-programs-26003.html; Joe Nocera, 
Killing Jobs and Making Us Sick, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com 
/2011/09/17/opinion/nocera-killing-jobs-and-making-us-sick.html. 
456 KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 40, at 95, 112 (discussing personnel training, data 
gathering, rulemaking, and enforcement); Klass 2009, supra note 44, at 1570 (rulemaking 
and enforcement); McGarity 2002, supra note 118, at 549 (policing against wrongdoing), 
567–68 (enforcement); Meiners & Yandle, supra note 23, at 961–62 (data gathering). “The 
net effect of these and other factors is that rarely, if ever, are agencies with large agendas 
for rulemaking given the staff and access to the essential expertise that they think they 
need to get the work done.” KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 40, at 112. 
457 KOLSTAD, supra note 19, at 337–39. 
458 Langpap & Shimshack, supra note 400, at 235; Czarnezki & Thomsen, supra note 
23, at 6–7. 
459 Thornton et al., supra note 53, at 264 (“Evidence abounds that regulatory violations 
by business firms are far from infrequent.”); Sangi, supra note 11, at 521 (“[T]he 
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enforcement of the CWA, for example, showed that “approximately 
25 percent of major facilities were in significant noncompliance with 
their CWA permits at any given time.”460 In fact, a body of empirical 
evidence suggests that the proliferation of environmental statutes in 
the 1970s had little to do with improving environmental quality.461 
Rather, environmental quality acts as a superior good: demand grows 
as income levels rise. Improvements in environmental quality, then, 
might not be a result of EPA’s actions, but rather the result of 
companies’ sensitivity to their public image and desire not to be 
associated with harm to the environment.462 
The contention that federal regulatory programs are not responsible 
for improvements in environmental quality, though, is a hard pill to 
swallow. I have no doubt that the normal functioning of the market, 
alongside advances in social norms, economic wellbeing, and science 
have contributed to improvements in environmental quality. But, as 
complex as enforcement issues are, I also have no doubt that federal 
environmental programs including the CAA, CWA, RCRA, and 
CERCLA (to name a few), have been hugely successful in improving 
the quality of the air we breathe and the water we drink. EPA’s 2010 
cost-benefit analysis of the CAA, for example, concluded that the 
costs of the CAA would reach $65 billion by 2020 while the benefits 
in improved air quality would reach an astounding $2 trillion.463 
From a cost-effectiveness perspective, then, there is no question that 
the CAA is a beneficial regulatory program. Nevertheless, large gaps 
in the design of our federal regulatory programs—for example, the 
CAA’s difficulty in addressing interstate air pollution and the CWA’s 
failure to regulate non-point source pollution—highlight that we can 	  
effectiveness of uniform federal legal standards is diminished when enforced non-
uniformly.”). 
460 Clifford Rechtschaffen, Enforcing the Clean Water Act in the Twenty-First Century: 
Harnessing the Power of the Public Spotlight, 55 ALA. L. REV. 775, 782–83 (2004); see 
also id. at 781–87 (detailing significant noncompliance with the mandates of the CWA); 
OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, A 
PILOT FOR PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF SELECTED COMPONENTS OF THE NATIONAL 
ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE PROGRAM (2003); Thornton et al., supra 
note 53, at 264. 
461 Meiners & Yandle, supra note 23, at 948–49 (citing Richard L. Revesz, 
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for 
Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992)). 
462 Meiners & Yandle, supra note 23, at 948–49. 
463 OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE BENEFITS AND 
COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT: 1990 TO 2020—SUMMARY REPORT 3 (2010), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/air/sect812/aug10/summaryreport.pdf. 
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do better. In that light, I submit that tort law has been and will 
continue to be a valuable policy instrument that Congress should 
consider with greater frequency. 
SYNTHESIS 
The appropriate way to approach environmental policy instrument 
choice is to first ask: Given the liability standards in place, should the 
government adopt a public regulatory instrument, and/or should it 
alter liability (or property) entitlements? Drawing on works from the 
fields of political science, public policy studies, economics, and law, I 
attempt with this Article to take a much more comprehensive and 
inter-disciplinary approach in addressing this question than prior 
studies that appear in the legal literature. Much of the literature has 
pitted liability standards against public regulation in a zero-sum 
contest. In reality, though, environmental and public health problems 
call for multiple policy instruments, and tort law and public 
regulatory rules usually operate as complements, not substitutes. 
Policymakers and scholars, therefore, should give additional thought 
in determining which instruments pair well with tort law. The 
evaluation criteria I have specified—corrective justice, democratic 
legitimacy, efficiency, and effectiveness—facilitate a thorough 
comparative institutional analysis between tort law and public 
regulation. 
There is, however, no standardized method by which to compare 
the evaluative criteria. In fact, weighing criteria against one another 
enters the realm of an entirely separate debate. Shavell and Kaplow, 
for example, argue that policy decisions should always be made on 
the basis of efficiency, not fairness.464 Richards reasons that the 
appropriate policy must achieve its environmental goal, subject to 
legal and political constraints, while minimizing abatement costs, 
implementation costs, and negative effects on public finance.465 This 
framework seems to make the most sense by incorporating contextual 
political factors and transaction costs into the analysis. Ultimately, the 
choice of policy instruments will turn on contextual factors including 
the nature of the problem, the attributes of the parties involved, the 
political climate, the available data, and some manifestation of the 
evaluative criteria. 
	  
464 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 227. 
465 Richards, supra note 1, at 224–30. 
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In Shavell’s initial framework comparing liability entitlements and 
public regulation, he concluded that administrative costs and 
information asymmetries weigh in favor of tort law.466 My analysis 
here echoes his conclusions. If tort law’s general deterrence signal is 
functioning effectively, then private parties should be able to avoid 
engaging the machinery of the judicial system. Even in the case of 
private litigation, though, the expense to the government is minimal 
relative to the cost of high-volume rulemaking by administrative 
agencies whose budgets and personnel resources are already stretched 
thin. Moreover, the tort law system seems to have the upper hand in 
its ability to incorporate private information, though plaintiffs often 
encounter difficulty in generating scientific data and uncovering the 
precise causal chain of events that led to their misfortune. I also 
believe that the courts’ greater insulation from undue interest-group 
influence, relative to Congress and agencies, weighs slightly in favor 
of liability entitlements. Interest group influence is a source of 
asymmetry in several areas of the policy process: industry and special 
interests have an informational advantage over the government and 
the public, they undemocratically influence public decision making to 
the disadvantage of the citizenry, and they undermine the 
effectiveness and efficiency of public regulations for personal 
financial gain. 
Perhaps the most powerful arguments in favor of increased reliance 
on liability entitlements as policy instruments, however, are their 
corrective justice function and political constraints on the enactment 
of other public policy instruments. While tort law functions as a 
policy tool through a general deterrence effect, its equally (and 
perhaps more) important dual purpose is to act as a compensation 
mechanism for victims. Alternative compensation mechanisms seem 
to be politically and financially infeasible. And, there is something to 
be said about victims being able to collect compensation from the 
parties who injured them: justice is an important function of our legal 
system that should not be forgotten or disregarded in a discussion 
about public policy. Neither should political constraints be 
underestimated. In the present political climate, discussions about 
pollution taxes and marketable allowances are simply (and 
unfortunately) non-starters. Despite rollbacks of liability entitlements 
by tort reform statutes in other areas (e.g., against gun manufacturers), 
environmental rights of action have persisted and even flourished, as 	  
466 Shavell 1984, supra note 4, at 365. 
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in the case of ecological nuisances.467 Furthermore, there is 
something attractive to progressives and libertarians alike in enabling 
victims of pollution to hold their wrongdoers accountable in court. 
Of course, several other evaluation criteria weigh in favor of public 
regulation. Despite the influence of special interests, public access to 
the policy-making process and the ability to hold legislators 
accountable for their policy choices are advantages of the public 
regulatory system. Democratic legitimacy should constrain instrument 
choice. That is, no environmental policy should undermine 
constitutional democratic principles. For reasons explained above, 
though, acknowledging the regulatory effects of the tort system is not 
undemocratic per se. Even though standards of care are communal 
standards, there is reason to suspect that standards established through 
cases that focus on narrow sets of facts do not reflect the collective 
will of the citizenry. What’s more, public participation in 
environmental lawmaking could possibly have the effect of 
incorporating large amounts of private information into public 
regulatory schemes.468 The expertise of agency and congressional 
staff that goes into the formation of those regulatory programs is also 
an advantage of public regulation. While judges and juries have the 
benefit of considering expert testimony, Daubert has (perhaps 
misguidedly) increased the burdens on plaintiffs who seek to present 
that testimony to them. 
Additionally, I again echo Shavell’s conclusion that capital 
constraints on the ability of polluters to pay damages and the 
likelihood that culpable parties may not face lawsuits significantly 
impair the effectiveness of tort law as policy tool. Plaintiffs often 
encounter great difficulty determining that they have been victims of 
a wrongful action, identifying the wrongdoer(s), establishing 
causation, and overcoming collective action problems. With plaintiffs 
facing so many barriers, general deterrence appears to be a weak 
regulatory mechanism. 
Regardless, the weaknesses of tort law do not validate the 
alternative: that plaintiffs must often overcome high transaction costs 
does not signify that public regulation is always more effective.469 
With strained budgets and time, agencies must design and enforce 
highly complex regulations in the face of opportunistic firms while 	  
467 See Czarnezki & Thomsen, supra note 23, at 2 (“A rebirth of the common law is 
already occurring.”). 
468 LAZARUS, supra note 95, at 189–90. 
469 Wagner, supra note 263, at 710. 
ABELKOP (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/14  4:45 PM 
2014] Tort Law as an Environmental Policy Instrument 467 
overcoming the perils of regulatory and information capture. 
Nevertheless, studies have shown that many public regulatory 
programs are, in fact, cost-effective. Few studies, on the other hand, 
have attempted to measure the effectiveness of environmental tort 
suits. With empirical evidence lacking, “one encourages or 
discourages tort litigation [as a policy tool] with great caution and 
little confidence.”470 
I have, however, identified the circumstances in which tort law will 
theoretically be most and least effective. As a preliminary matter, tort 
law’s greatest strength is to provide victims with a mechanism to 
collect compensation from wrongdoers when they have been unjustly 
injured. Environmental statutes, therefore, should preserve state 
liability remedies as a compensation mechanism when there is no 
alterative compensatory policy in place. It is tort law’s greatest 
weakness—imperfection in its deterrence signal—however, that 
dictates when it will be most effective. The factors that muddle the 
deterrence signal include the perceived likelihood that a suit may not 
be brought (because of plaintiffs’ high transaction costs), capital 
constraints on businesses, and the behavioral characteristics of 
managers. 
There is reason to believe that tort law will be most effective, then, 
in cases that involve a concentrated harm from a concentrated 
source—so-called paradigm cases.471  While the incidence of a 
paradigm case would not address a tortfeasor’s capital constraints, it 
would mitigate the effects of the other two factors. Generally, the 
more distinct the harm, the easier it will be for the plaintiff to identify 
herself as the victim of a wrongdoing and establish a causal 
connection between her injury and the wrongful action; and the more 
concentrated the source, the easier it will be for the plaintiff to 
identify the responsible party. Moreover, in certain instances where a 
liability entitlement exists to govern the activity of a readily 
identifiable group of potential polluters, those firms’ perceptions of 
their exposure to liability would grow concordantly—potentially 
mitigating the effects of managers’ behavioral tendencies. Both the 
plaintiffs’ transaction costs and firms’ inclinations to discount the 
likelihood of litigation, however, will likely increase as the harm and 
the sources grow more diffuse.472  	  
470 Shavell 1984, supra note 3, at 6. 
471 Brennan, supra note 88, at 46; Latham et al., supra note 114, at 753; Menell, supra 
note 44, at 110; Schroeder, supra note 44, at 599. 
472 Hylton, supra note 57, at 529–30; Schroeder, supra note 44, at 601–02. 
ABELKOP (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/14  4:45 PM 
468 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92, 2 
A notable strength of the tort system is its capacity to incorporate 
privately held information from both injured parties and risk-taking 
firms. Therefore, when the government encounters information 
asymmetries that are skewed heavily toward industry or lacks 
information on the extent and nature of the harm, then policymakers 
will want to take special care to preserve tort law and should consider 
a statutory liability entitlement—as in the case of hazardous waste 
and CERCLA. Also recall that standards are cheaper to promulgate 
than rules, but are more expensive to apply.473 Given the low 
governance costs associated with liability standards and the higher 
relative costs of rulemaking, policymakers should prefer tort law to 
regulate heterogeneous activities—precisely the activities that will 
present information asymmetries. 
Finally, complementing public regulations with state tort law 
builds multidimensional institutional diversity and reflexivity into 
policy instruments by involving actors at local, state, and federal 
levels.474 As tort standards evolve, those that prove unworkable (or 
that function as poor policy complements) will be weeded out while 
those that prove more beneficial may enhance the function of their 
complementary policy tools. 
All things considered, the usefulness of tort law as an 
environmental policy instrument presents a fundamental question 
regarding the role of liability entitlements that policymakers should 
take more care to resolve than they have in the past. Notably, many of 
the major environmental statutes have savings clauses that preserve 
state liability law. Congress decided to preserve state tort law not only 
to serve as a compensatory mechanism for victims, but also to 
function as a higher regulatory standard (if states so choose) that may 
rise above the floor established by federal regulations, to catch cases 
that fall through regulatory gaps, and to address novel harms.475 
However, many of those clauses, as well as areas in which Congress 
does intend to preempt state law, lack clarity: “In many of the recent 
preemption cases the Court has considered, . . . Congress has not been 
clear about whether it intends to preempt state tort law or whether it 	  
473 Eagle, supra note 323, at 618–19; Kaplow, supra note 14, at 563–64. 
474 Butler, supra note 14, at 744–45; Buzbee, supra note 19, at 1576. 
475 Abraham, supra note 5, at 391; Czarnezki & Thomsen, supra note 23, at 2–3, 29–
30; Kaswan, supra note 68, at 101, 103; Klass 2007, supra note 157, at 547 (discussing 
common law in the age of “new federalism”); McGarity 2005, supra note 170, at 372–73; 
Meiners & Yandle, supra note 23, at 959–61; Sangi, supra note 10, at 482 (criticizing 
TVA). 
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intends to delegate to federal agencies the power to preempt state tort 
law through regulation.”476 The Court must then decide whether or 
not to defer to bureaucratic decisions to preempt state tort law. To 
avoid the confusion that contributed to the rise of these cases and 
misguided decisions, such as the Fourth Circuit’s preemption ruling in 
TVA, Congress should be more explicit regarding the instances in 
which it intends to preempt state law. 
The literature addressing liability entitlements as a policy tool has 
thus far framed the debate as one between common law against public 
law. However, tort law does not have to be common law at all. 
Rather, Congress can employ liability entitlement as a public 
regulatory tool, designed by expert agencies and carefully woven into 
the regulatory fabric of a statutory program as a private information-
gathering, enforcement, deterrence, and compensation mechanism. In 
an increasingly gridlocked policy-making climate overshadowed by 
an anti-environment House, policymakers and courts must be 
exceedingly innovative and, when circumstances call for it, more 
seriously embrace tort law as an environmental policy instrument. 
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